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A debate continues on whether anticipatory self-defense is permitted in the
era of the U.N. Charter.1 Two recent commentators say that states need
1. Compare, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.CJ. 4,
347 (June 27) (Schwebel,J., dissenting) (Nicaragua Case); STANIMIR A. ALExANDROV, SELF-
DEFENSE AGAINST THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 296 (1996); D.W. BowErr,
SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 187-93 (1958); BENGT BRoMS, THE DEFINITION OF
AGGRESSION IN THE UNTED NATIONS 127 (1968); 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW § 127
(RobertJennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992); HANS KELSEN, COLLECTIVE SECURITY
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 27 (Nay. War C. Int'l L. Stud., v. 49, 1956); TIMOTHY L.H.
McCORMACK, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE ISRAELI RAID ON THE IRAQI
NUCLEAR REACTOR 122-44, 238-39, 253-84, 302 (1996); MYRES S. McDOUGAL & FLOREN-
TINO FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 232-41 (1961); OscAR
SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAw IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 152-55 (1991); JULIUS STONE,
OF LAW AND NATIONS: BETWEEN POWER POLITICS AND HUMAN HoPES 3 (1974); ANN VAN
WYNEN THOMAS & A.J. THOMAS, THE CONCEPT OF AGGRESSION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 127
(1972); George Bunn, International Law and the Use of Force in Peacetime: Do U.S. Ships
Have to Take the First Hit?, 39 NAy. WAR C. REv. 69-70 (May-June 1986); Christopher
Greenwood, Remarks, in Panel, Neutrality, The Rights of Shipping and the Use of Force in
the Persian Gulf War (Part 1), 1988 PRoc. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 158, 160-61 (1990); David K.
Linnan, Self-Defense, Necessity and U.N. Collective Security: United States and Other
Views, 1991 DUKEJ. COMP. & INT'L L. 57, 65-84, 122; A.V. Lowe, The Commander's Hand-
book on the Law of Naval Operations and the Contemporary Law of the Sea, in THE LAw or
NAVAL OPERATIONS 109, 127-30 (Nav. War C. Int'l L. Stud., v. 64, Horace B. Robertson
ed., 1991); James McHugh, Forcible Self-Help in International Law, 25 NAv. WAR C. REV.
61 (No. 2, 1972); Rein Mullerson & David J. Scheffer, Legal Regulation of the Use of
Force, in BEYOND CONFRONTATION: INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 93,
109-14 (Lori Fisler Damrosch et al. ed., 1995); John F. Murphy, Commentary on Inter-
vention to Combat Terrorism and Drug Trafficking, in LoRi FISLER DAMROSCH & DAVID J.
SCHEFFER, LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEw INTERNATIONAL ORDER 241 (1991); W. Michael
Reisman, Allocating Competences to Use Coercion in the Post-Cold War World: Practices,
Conditions, and Prospects, in DAMROSCH & SCHEFFER, supra, at 25, 45; Horace B. Robert-
son, Jr., Contemporary International Law: Relevant to Today's World?, 45 NAy. WAR C.
REV. 89, 101 (1992); Robert F. Turner, State Sovereignty, International Law, and the Use
of Force in Countering Low-Intensity Aggression in the Modern World, in LEGAL AND MORAL
CONSTRAINTS ON LOW-INTENSrrY CONFLICT 43, 62-80 (Nav. War C. Int'l L. Stud., v. 67,
Alberto Coll et al. eds., 1995); and C.H.M. Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by
Individual States in International Law, 81 R.C.A.D.I. 451, 496-99 (1952) (anticipatory
self-defense permissible, as long as principles of necessity and proportionality
observed), with, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES
257-61, 275-78, 366-67 (1963); YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENSE
182-87, 190 (2d ed. 1994); Louis HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 121-
22 (1995); PHILIP C. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 166-67 (1948); D.P. O'CONNELL,
THE INFLUENCE oP LAW ON SEA PowER 83, 171 (1979); 2 LASsA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL
LAW § 52aa, at 156 (Hersch Lauterj~acht ed., 7th ed. 1952); AHMED M. RIFAAT, INTERNA-
TIONAL AGGRESSION 126 (1974); BRUNO SIMMA, THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A
COMMENTARY 675-76 (1994); Tom Farer, Law and War, in 3 THE FUTuRE OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL LEGAL ORDER 30, 36-37 (Cyril E. Black & Richard A. Falk eds., 1971); Yuri M.
Kolosov, Limiting the Use of Force: Self-Defense, Terrorism, and Drug Trafficking, in LAw
AND FORCE, supra, at 233, 235; Josef L. Kunz, Individual and Collective Self-Defense in
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 872, 878 (1947); Rainer
Lagoni, Neutrality, the Rights of Shipping, supra, at 161, 162, and Robert W. Tucker, The
Interpretation of War Under Present International Law, 4 INT'L L.Q. 11, 29-30 (1951). See
also W. Tucker, Reprisals and Self-Defense: The Customary Law, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 586
(1951) (states may respond only after being attacked). The USSR generally subscribed
to the restrictive view. Kolosov, supra, at 234; Mullerson & Scheffer, supra, at 107. U.S.
policy is that states may respond in anticipatory self-defense, subject to necessity and
proportionality principles. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE OCEANS LAW & POLICY DEPARTMENT,
ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERA-
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not await the first blow but may react in self-defense, provided that princi-
ples of necessity and proportionality are observed.2 They differ, however,
on when states may claim anticipatory self-defense. 3 Such a disagreement
is not surprising, given that some commentators seem to change views, 4
while others take no clear position at all.5
Most anticipatory self-defense claims since World War II have been
asserted by states responding unilaterally to another country's actions. It
is claims of this nature that should be expected in the future.6 Article 51 of
the U.N. Charter declares that "Nothing in the ... Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack
occurs against a [U.N.] Member. :. until the Security Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."7 This
article analyzes an alternative to individual self-defense, that is, collective
security pursuant to a treaty.
After examining nineteenth and twentieth century international agree-
ments, this Article will analyze the scope of collective self-defense in Char-
ter era treaties. The question arises whether the agreements include a right
of anticipatory collective self-defense paralleling the state's right to claim
individual anticipatory self-defense. Moreover, if there is a right of antici-
patory collective self-defense, what is the scope of that right, and what are
the limitations on it?
rIoNs: NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-2.1/COMDTPUB P5800.1 cIl 4.3.2-4.3.2.1 (1997) [herein-
after NWP 1-14]. Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 L.CJ. 4 (June 27) at 103, declined to address the
issue. NWP 1-14, supra, replaces UNITED STATES DEPARTmENT OF THE NAVY, ANNOTATED
SUPPLEMENT TO THE CoMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAv OF NAVAL OPERATIONS: NWP
9A/FMFM 1-10 (1987) [hereinafter NWP 9A].
2. See ALEXANDROV, supra note 1, at 296; McCORMACK, supra note 1, at 12244, 238-
39, 253-84, 302.
3. Compare ALEXANDROV, supra note 1, at 159-65 (1981 Israeli air raid on Iraqi
nuclear reactor not anticipatory self-defense), with McCoRMACK, supra note 1, at 285-302
(raid within limits of anticipatory self-defense).
4. Compare, e.g., 1 D.P. O'CoNNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAw 25 (1970) (favoring antici-
patory self-defense), with O'CoNNELL, supra note 1, at 83, 171 (then-current naval think-
ing was leaning toward the reactive view). O'Connell is equivocal on the point. See 2
D.P. O'CONNELL, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 795, 797, 803-08, 104445, 1095-
1101 (I.A. Shearer ed. 1984). Compare KELSEN, supra note 1, at 27 with HANS KELsEN,
THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 791-93 (1950). Where possible, I have listed commen-
tators' views based on their last published position.
5. Cf., e.g., Addendum to the Eighth Report on State Responsibility, 1980 2(1) Y.B.
INT'L L. COMM'N 13, 66-70, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/318/ADD.5-7 (1980); LELAND F. GOOD-
RICH ET AL., CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 342-53 (3d ed. 1969); 2 O'CONNELL, supra
note 4, at 795, 797, 803-08, 104445, 1095-1101. McCormack says that Goodrich et al.
are among those favoring a restrictive or "reactive" view. See McCoRMAcK, supra note 1,
at 122 (citing GOODRICH ETr AL., supra, at 353). However, Goodrich et al. seem to be
straddling the fence on the interpretation of U.N. Charter article 51. See GOODRICH ET
AL., supra, at 342-53; INTERNATIONAL LAWYERs & NAVAL EXPERTS CONVENED BY THE INTER-
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HUMANITARIAN LAw, SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW
APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLCrS AT SEA c 3, Commentary 3.3 (Louise Doswald-Beck ed.,
1995). San Remo Manual takes no position on the issue.
6. See Lowe, supra note 1, at 128.
7. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
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If the Peace of Westphalia (1648) began the nation-state system,8 then
the Congress of Vienna (1815) started the modern movement toward col-
lective security. 9 It is from this benchmark that Part I examines treaty sys-
tems through World War I. Part iI analyzes treaty systems during the era of
the Covenant of the League of Nations10 (1920-46) and the Pact of Paris 1
(1928) through World War II. Part III examines the drafting of the Charter
and court decisions, including the Nuremberg International Military Tribu-
nal, immediately following World War II. Part IV examines collective self-
defense treaties concluded since 1945. Part V offers projections for the
future of anticipatory collective self-defense in the Charter era.
Between the time of the American alliance with France (1778)12 and
the time of the Declaration of Panama (1939), 13 the United States did not
ratify a single mutual self-defense agreement. The lack of U.S. participa-
tion in this kind of arrangement may explain why many in the United
States are not familiar with the concept of collective self-defense, particu-
larly anticipatory collective self-defense. The concept of anticipatory col-
8. Treaty of Peace, Fr.-Holy Rom. Empire, Oct. 14/24, 1648, 1 Consol. T.S. 198,
319; Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia 1648-1948, 42 Am. J. INT'L L. 20 (1948) (com-
menting on the Treaty of Peace).
9. Act of the Congress of Vienna, June 9, 1815, 64 Consol. T.S. 453 (Fr.). The
Treaty of Alliance, Mar. 15, 1815, 64 Consol. T.S. 27, was a linchpin of the Congress
system; it was succeeded by the Treaty of Alliance and Friendship, Nov. 20, 1815, 65
Consol. T.S. 296 (Fr.). See EUGENE V. RosTow, TowARt MANAGED PEACE 4243 (1993).
See also infra notes 14-25 and accompanying text. Parties to the Treaty of Peace were
"obliged to defend and protect all and every Article of this Peace against any one." This
represents an early statement of the collective self-defense principle. Treaty of Peace,
supra note 8, art. 123, at 354. See also Gross, supra note 8, at 24.
10. The Covenant of the League of Nations was in the Treaty of Versailles, June 28,
1919, Part I, 225 Consol. T.S. 189, 195-205, and other World War I peace treaties, see,
e.g., Treaty of Nuilly-sur-Seine, Nov. 27, 1919, Part I, 226 Consol. T.S. 332, 335 (Bulga-
ria); Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye, Sept. 10, 1919, Part I, 226 Consol. T.S. 8, 13 (Aus-
tria); Treaty of Trianon, June 4, 1920, Part 1, 113 Brit. For. & St. Pap. 486, 491-501
(Hungary). Although a signatory, the United States never ratified these treaties, primar-
ily because the U.S. Senate opposed the Covenant. See MichaelJ. Glennon, The Constitu-
tion and Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, 85 Am. J. Ir'L L. 74, 75-76 (1991).
Instead, the United States concluded bilateral peace treaties with Austria, Germany, and
Hungary, thereby incorporating parts of the multilateral peace treaties. See, e.g., Treaty
of Peace, Hung.-U.S., Aug. 29, 1921, art. 2, 42 Stat. 1951, 1953 (incorporating parts of
Treaty of Trianon); Treaty of Peace, Ger.-U.S., Aug. 25, 1921, art. 2, 42 Stat. 1939, 1942
(incorporating parts of Treaty of Versailles); Treaty of Peace, Aus.-U.S., Aug. 24, 1921,
art. 2, 42 Stat. 1946, 1948 (incorporating parts of Treaty of St. Germaine-en-Laye). The
Treaty of Sevres, Aug. 10, 1920, Part I, 113 Brit. & For. St. Pap. 652, 656, would have
incorporated the Covenant for a peace treaty with Turkey but was never ratified. The
Treaty of Lausanne, July 24, 1923, 28 L.N.T.S. 11, ended the war for Turkey but did not
refer to the Covenant. As the United States had never declared war against Turkey, it did
not sign a peace treaty with Turkey.
11. Treaty Providing for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy,
Aug. 28, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57 [hereinafter Pact of Paris].
12. See Treaty of Alliance, Feb. 6, 1778, Fr.-U.S., arts. 1-4, 8 Stat. 6, 6-8. The Treaty
of Amity and Commerce, Feb. 6, 1778, Fr.-U.S., arts. 6-7, 8 Stat. 12, 16, and the Treaty of
Amity and Commerce, Oct. 8, 1782, Neth.-U.S., art. 5, 8 Stat. 32, 34-36, pledged mutual
maritime defense to France and the Netherlands, respectively.
13. Declaration of Panama, Oct. 3, 1939, 3 Bevans 609. See also infra notes 190-99
and accompanying text.
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lective self-defense has existed for nearly two centuries, including the fifty
years during which the Charter has been in force, and this form of joint
response by states appears to have attained the status of a customary
norm.
1. From the Congress of Vienna to World War I
Only months after an ad hoc alliance14 defeated Napoleon I at Waterloo
and established the Congress system,' 5 the principal powers began build-
ing alliances to assure peace. Austria, Prussia, and Russia pledged in the
Holy Alliance 16 (September 1815) that:
Conformably to . . . Holy Scriptures, which command all men to consider
each other as brethren, the Three contracting Monarchs will remain united
by ... a true and indissoluble fraternity, and considering each other as
fellow countrymen, they will, on all occasions and in all places, lend each
other aid and assistance; and, regarding themselves toward their subjects
and armies as fathers of families, they will lead them, in the same spirit of
fraternity with which they are animated, to protect Religion, Peace, and
Justice.17
While Great Britain's Prince Regent declined to join this Alliance, at least
14. Treaty of Alliance, Mar. 25, 1815, 64 Consol. T.S. 27.
15. Act of the Congress of Vienna, supra note 9 (providing for the reorganization of
Europe). The coalition against Napoleon had pledged such a system in the Treaty of
Alliance, Mar. 15, 1814, 64 Consol. T.S. 27. See also AtAN P~A.MER, THE Ci-HANCE.I. s
OF EUROPE 6 (1983).
16. Holy Alliance, Sept. 11-26, 1815, 65 Consol. T.S. 199 (Fr.).
17. Id. art. 1, 65 Consol. T.S. at 201. Article 2 also proclaimed:
In consequence, the sole principle of force, whether between the said Govern-
ments or between their Subjects, shall be that of doing each other reciprocal
service, and of testifying by unalterable good will the mutual affection with
which they ought to be animated, to consider themselves all as members of one
and the same Christian nation; the three allied Princes looking on themselves as
merely delegated by Providence to govern three branches of the One family,
namely, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, thus confessing that the Christian world,
of which they and their people form a part, has in reality no other Sovereign
than Him to whom all the treasures of love, science, and infinite wisdom, that is
to say, God, our Divine Saviour, the Word of the Most High, the Word of Life.
Their Majesties consequently recommend to their people, with the most tender
solicitude, as the sole means of enjoying that Peace which arises from a good
conscience, and which alone is durable, to strengthen themselves every day
more and more in the principles and exercise of the duties which the Divine
Saviour has taught to mankind.
Id. art. 2, at 201. The preamble asserted that the signatories:
declare that the present [Alliance] has no other object than to publish, in the
face of the whole world, their fixed resolution, both in the administration of
their respective States, and in their political relations with every other Govern-
ment, to take for their sole guide the precepts of that Holy Religion, namely, the
precepts of Justice, Christian Charity, and Peace, which, far from being applica-
ble only to private concerns, must have an immediate influence on the councils
of Princes, and guide all their steps, as being the only means of consolidating
human institutions and remedying their imperfections.
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six other European states acceded to it.' The result was codified in the
Treaty of Alliance and Friendship in November 1815, which continued the
earlier alliance's collective security policy. 19 Besides confirming standing
forces in France, the allies agreed to:
concert together, without loss of time, as to the additional ... troops to be
furnished . . . for the support of the common cause; and they engage to
employ, in case of need, the whole of their forces... to bring the War to a
speedy and successful termination, reserving to themselves to prescribe, by
common consent, such conditions of Peace as shall hold out to Europe a
sufficient guarantee against the recurrence of a similar calamity, [that is, the
advent of another conquest.] 20
They also agreed to meet periodically to "consult ... upon their common
interests, and for the consideration of the measures which at each of those
periods shall be considered the most salutary for the repose and prosperity
of Nations, and for the maintenance of the Peace of Europe. '2 1
The Alliance, to which France was admitted as part of the Concert of
Europe in 1818,22 had two policies: periodic consultations to consider
measures to help preserve peace; and the commitment of forces to end any
conflict that had igrited.2 3 The Alliance thus bespoke the collective self-
defense concept and, depending on the nature of consultations and actions
decided, a potential for anticipatory self-defense. 24 An example of the lat-
Id. preamble, at 200-01. See also PALMER, supra note 15, at 21-23.
18. See Letter from Emperor Francis of Austria, King Frederick William of Prussia,
and Tsar Alexander of Russia to George, Prince Regent of Great Britain (Sept. 26, 1815);
letter from Prince Regent to Francis, Frederick William and Alexander (Oct. 6, 1815),
reprinted in 1 KEY TREATIES FOR THE GREAT POWERS 1814-1914, at 97-99 (Michael Hurst
ed., 1972) [hereinafter KEY TREATIES]. The Holy Alliance continued to function, to a
certain extent, until the crisis leading to the Crimean War. See generally PALMER, supra
note 15, at 23; A.J.P. TAYLOR, THE STRUGGLE FOR MASTERY IN EUROPE: 1848-1918 chs. 2-3
(1954). The Alliance extended to the New World through family ties between the Aus-
trian court and Brazil, a kingdom (1815) and an empire itself from 1822. The Alliance
was a rationale for the Congress of Panama (1826) and the Monroe Doctrine. See 0.
CARLOS STOETZER, THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES 7, 9, 14 (2d ed. 1993). Article
21 of the Covenant of the League of Nations declared the Covenant would not "affect the
validity of international engagements, such as . . . regional understandings like the
Monroe Doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace." LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVE-
NANT art. 21. See also infra notes 45, 158-62, 190-99, 205-07, 255-62 and accompanying
text.
19. Treaty of Alliance and Friendship, Nov. 20, 1815, preamble, 65 Consol. T.S. 296
(Fr.), referring to Treaty of Alliance, Mar. 15, 1815, 64 Consol. T.S. 27. See also PALMER,
supra note 15, at 6, 25-28.
20. Treaty of Alliance and Friendship, supra note 19, art. 4, 65 Consol. T.S. at 298.
21. Id. arts. 3-4, 6, at 297-98.
22. Protocol of Conference, Nov. 15, 1818, 69 Consol. T.S. 365 (Fr.). The Concert
of Europe "formed what was arguably the most successful postwar European Settle-
ment" and was a set of informal understandings in which European powers acted to
defuse problems that might lead to conflict among them. MICHAEL MANDELBAUM, THE
DAWN OF PEACE IN EUROPE 106 (1996). See also DONALD KAGAN, ON THE ORIGINS OF WAR
AND THE PRESERVATION OF PEACE 83 (1995); Gross, supra note 8, at 20. Treaties discussed
in this Part frequently resulted from these conferences.
23. See Treaty of Alliance and Friendship, supra note 19, 65 Consol. T.S. 296.
24. A decade later Russia and Turkey concluded Treaty of Defensive Alliance, July 8-
26, 1833, arts. 1, 3-4, 84 Consol. T.S. 1, 3-5 (providing that Russia would furnish forces
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ter occurred in 1848, when revolution in France resulted in the transition
to the Second Republic. Fearing a new war of French national liberation,
Prussia put its Rhine troops on alert, and Russia directed its armies to be
ready for war. Tsar Nicholas was dissuaded from sending 30,000 to help
Prussia, a move that might have resulted in war.25
It was in this context that the Caroline Case (1842) formulated the
right of anticipatory self-defense, which held that a proportional anticipa-
tory response in self-defense is permissible when the need is necessary,
instant, overwhelming, and admitting of no other alternative with "no
moment for deliberation."2 6 The final requirement - no moment for delib-
eration - is not inconsistent with consultation clauses in the early treaties.
States, then and now, may consult and decide whether to employ anticipa-
tory collective self-defense as a response to a threat. Moreover, states might
agree that those countries claiming a right of anticipatory self-defense may
respond through collective self-defense.
A. The Crimean War
The potential for reactive and anticipatory collective self-defense was real-
ized again during the Crimean War (1854).27 The war erupted when Rus-
sia occupied the Turkish principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia. Britain
and France declared that:
[they had] concerted, and will concert together, as to the most proper means
for liberating the territory of the Sultan from foreign invasion, and for
accomplishing the object ... [of reestablishing peace between Russia and
Turkey and preserving the continent from "lamentable complications which
... so unhappily disturbed the general Peace"].... IT]hey engage to main-
tain, according to the requirements of the war, to be judged of by common
agreement, sufficient naval and military forces to meet those requirements,
the description, number, and destination whereof shall, if occasion should
to Turkey for defense against attack). The Final Act of Ministerial Conferences to Com-
plete and Consolidate Organization of the Germanic Confederation, May 15, 1820, arts.
35-41, 47, 71 Consol. T.S. 89, 116-18 (Gr.), contemplated collective action for
threatened attacks as well as invasions. The Treaty of Peace, Aug. 23, 1866, Aus.-Pruss.,
art. 4, 133 Consol. T.S. 71, 82 dissolved the Confederation (Gr.).
25. See PALMER, supra note 15, at 81-82. Fearful of an attempted Spanish reconquest
of South America's Andean states, Bolivia, Chile, New Granada (now Colombia) and
Peru signed the Treaty of Lima, Feb. 8, 1848, which established a confederation of the
signatories to meet the perceived threat. The danger dissipated, however, and the treaty
was never ratified. See STOETZER, supra note 18, at 9.
26. R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 Am. J. INT'L L. 82, 89 (1938).
See also NWP 9A, supra note 1, [ 4.3.2.1, n.29 (citing Bunn, supra note 1, at 70); Letter
from U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster to U.K. Ambassador Lord Alexander B. Ash-
burton, Aug. 6, 1842, in Destruction of the Caroline, 2 Moore DIGEST § 217, at 411-12
(1906); Letter of Secretary Webster to U.K. Minister Henry S. Fox, Apr. 24, 1841, in 1
KENNETH E. SHEwMAiER, THE PAPERS OF DANEL WEBsTER: DIPLOMAIC PAPERS 58, 67
(1983). NWP 1-14 departs from this language, arguing that "the Webster formulation is
clearly too restrictive today, particularly given the nature and lethality of modern weap-
ons systems which may be employed with little, if any, warning." NWP 1-14, supra note
1, 4.3.2.1 n.32.
27. For analysis of wartime diplomacy, see PALMER, supra note 15, at 101-10; TAYLOR,
supra note 18, at 62-82.
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arise, be determined by subsequent arrangements. 28
Britain and France renounced "[a]cquisition of any advantage for them-
selves" and invited other European powers to accede to the alliance. 29 Aus-
tria and Prussia tried to avoid involvement in the war "and the dangers
arising therefrom to the Peace of Europe"30 by concluding a Treaty of Alli-
ance, which stated, inter alia, that "a mutual offensive advance is stipulated
for only in the event of the incorporation of the Principalities, or ... attack
on or passage of the Balkans by Russia."31 In late 1854, Austria, Britain,
and France allied in an attempt to protect Austria's occupation of the same
principalities against the return of Russian forces. In the event of war
between Austria and Russia, the three countries pledged their "Offensive
and Defensive Alliance in the present War, and will for that purpose
employ, according to the requirements of the War, Military and Naval
Forces."32 Similar terms appeared in an allied convention with Sardinia in
1855. 33 That same year, Britain and France pledged to "furnish... Swe-
den ... sufficient Naval and Military Forces to Co-operate with the Naval
and Military Forces of [Sweden to] ... resist ... Pretensions or Aggressions
of Russia."3 4 The treaty ring around Russia thus tightened.
Preparations for the Crimea expedition, proposed in the Anglo-French
treaty,35 clearly reflected the principle of anticipatory self-defense. Like-
wise, the Austro-Prussian alliance recognized the concept of "Offensive
Advance," anticipatory action if Russia moved through the Balkans, 36 that
is, the parties would attack Russia only if Russia passed through territory
close to Austrian borders. Similar concepts were recognized in both the
Austro-Anglo-French alliance and the Sardinia military convention. 37 The
Swedish treaty also provided a preemptive strategy in case of Russian
aggression. 38
28. Convention Relative to Military Aid to Be Given to Turkey, Apr. 10, 1854, Fr.-Gr.
Brit., art. 2, 111 Consol. T.S. 393, 395-96, referring to art. 1.
29. Id. art. 4, 111 Consol. T.S. at 396.
30. Treaty of Offensive and Defensive Alliance, Apr. 20, 1854, Aus.-Pruss., Premable,
111 Consol. T.S. 413, 422.
31. Id., 111 Consol. T.S. at 424.
32. Treaty of Alliance, Dec. 2, 1854, arts. 3, 6, 112 Consol. T.S. 295, 298 (Fr.) (trans-
lation by Author). Later arrangements would determine the numbers, description, and
destination of the forces. Id. Prussia was later invited to accede. Id.
33. Id. Cf. Military Convention, Jan. 26, 1855, 112 Consol. T.S. 453 (Fr.).
34. Common agreement would determine forces' numbers, description, and destina-
tion. Sweden pledged not to cede, exchange territory, give pasturage, or fishery rights
"or rights of any other nature whatsoever .... and to resist any pretension ... by Russia
... to establish the existence of any ... Rights aforesaid." Treaty of Stockholm, Nov. 21,
1855, arts. 1-2, 114 Consol. T.S. 13, 15-16 (Fr.) (translation by Author). The United
States observed "benevolent neutrality" in favor of Russia during the war. JOHN LEwIs
GADDI5, THE LONG PEACE: INQUIRIES INTO THE HISTORY OF THE COLD WAR 5 (1987).
35. Convention Relative to Military Aid to Be Given to Turkey, supra note 28.
36. Treaty of Offensive and Defensive Alliance, supra note 30.
37. Treaty of Stockholm, supra note 34.
38. A treaty, ending the Crimean War, provided for mediating future disputes before
recourse to force and was a forerunner of U.N. CHARTER art. 33. See General Treaty for
Re-Establishment of Peace, Mar. 30, 1856, art. 8, 114 Consol. T.S. 409, 414 (Fr.). A
related protocol suggested the procedure be available for future disputes. Protocol of
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Alliances embodying the principle of anticipatory self-defense were
both formal and informal. France and Sardinia concluded an oral agree-
ment prior tothe Franco-Austrian war (1858-59).3 9 This agreement is an
example of a self-defense arrangement made without benefit of a formal
treaty. It created both a defensive and offensive alliance. France pledged to
come to the aid of Sardinia if it or Austria declared war, and further stated
its intention to declare war should Italian territory become occupied, Aus-
tria violate an existing treaty, or a similar event occur.40 During the
Franco-Prussian War (1870-71), the belligerents informally agreed to coop-
erate with Britain to assure Belgian neutrality if Belgium was threatened by
an opponent.4 1 In both cases, the potential for conflict was great and
could have led to what would be considered today as anticipatory self-
defense. The utility of an informal self-defense arrangement is further
illustrated by Napoleon III's response to Prussian mobilization of six army
corps during the 1858-59 conflict; this anticipatory action "inclined him
further to make peace."42 Likewise a Russian-U.S. informal arrangement
was proposed during the U.S. Civil War, when a Russian admiral confiden-
tially advised U.S. Admiral David G. Farragut in 1863 that he had "sealed
orders" to support the United States if it became involved in conflict with a
foreign power (such as Britain or France) which supported the Confeder-
acy, a war that never was. 43 As will be seen, this form of informal collec-
tive self-defense is available today under the U.N. Charter.44
Conference, Apr. 14, 1856, reprinted in 1 KEY TRFarIps, supra note 18, at 334. In the
Western Hemisphere, as a result of the William Walker filibustering expeditions, Chile,
Ecuador, and Peru signed, but did not ratify, a Treaty of Mutual Assistance and Confed-
eration, which provided that if the United States attacked one or more parties, "all
would unite against the aggressor." SToETZER, supra note 18, at 9-10. The treaty was
never ratified. Id.
39. Count Nigra, Notes on Results of Meeting between Napoleon III of France and
Count Cavour of Piedmont, July 20, 1858, arts. 1, 3-4, reprinted in KEY TRATIES, supra
note 18, at 401.
40. Id.
41. Treaty Relative to Independence and Neutrality of Belgium, Aug. 9, 1870, Gr.
Brit.-Pruss., arts. 1-2, 141 Consol. T.S. 435, 438-39; Treaty Relative to Independence and
Neutrality of Belgium, Aug. 11, 1870, Fr.-Gr. Brit., arts. 1-2, 141 Consol. T.S. 441, 443-
44. See also Treaty Relative to Separation of Belgium from Holland, Nov. 15, 1831, art.
7, 82 Consol. T.S. 255, 259 (Fr.); Treaty of London, Apr. 19, 1839, art. 7, 88 Consol. T.S.
445, 449 (Fr.) (also guaranteeing Belgian neutrality). German violation of Belgian neu-
trality was a cause of World War I. See KAGAN, supra note 22, at 61, 129, 204.
42. PALMER, supra note 15, at 118.
43. The Russian fleets were wintering in New York and San Francisco at this time.
JAMES P. DuFFY, LINCOLN's ADMIRAL: THE CIVIL WAR CAMPAIGNS OF DAVID FARRAGuT 220-
21 (1997). The Russian visit came at a low point in Union fortunes; the Russians were
feted in New York, San Francisco, and Washington. Whether Russia and the United
States discussed an alliance then or in 1861 has been debated; most assert that there
were at least conversations toward that end. See D.P. CROOK, THE NORTH, THE Soum,
AND THE PowERs 1861-1865, at 317-18 (1974); DONALDSON JORIDAN & EDWIN J. PRATT,
EUROPE AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 200-01 (1969); ALBERT A. WOLDMAN, LINCOLN AND
THE RUSSIANS ch. 9 (1952). Gaddis linked this proposed cooperation to U.S. "benevolent
neutrality" during the Crimean War. GADDIS, supra note 34, at 5-6.
44. See infra Part IV.
Cornell International Law Journal
Western Hemisphere states, but not the United States, negotiated the
same kind of alliances as those in Europe. In Latin America, the War of the
Triple Alliance (1865-70) inspired Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay to sign
an offensive and defensive alliance to oppose Paraguayan aggression. At
the same time, other Latin American countries signed defensive alliances
pledging consultation and mutual defense against aggressors or acts
intending to deprive them of sovereignty and independence. 45
B. The Treaty Map Up to World War I, 1871-1914
After the Franco-Prussian War ended,46 agreements culminating in the
Triple Alliance (Austria-Hungary, Germany, Italy), and those resulting in
the Entente of France and Russia, and ultimately, Great Britain, contained
elements of reactive or anticipatory self-defense. The 1907 Hague Conven-
tions, which are still in force, imposed rules for war declarations 47 and
forbade resort to war to collect contract debts.48 However, the Convention
does not address the collective self-defense issue. States continued to rely
on alliance systems to provide collective self-defense. Some alliances
explicitly recognized anticipatory self-defense. Taylor points out that these
alliances, along with economic development on the Continent, gave Europe
thirty-four years of peace.49 Cannot the same be said about alliance sys-
tems50 and regional economic development treaties51 since World War II?
The Convention of Schonbrunn (1873) provided that if an "aggression
coming from a third Power should threaten to compromise the peace of
Europe, [the parties] mutually engage to come to a preliminary under-
standing.., to agree as to the line of conduct to be followed in common. '52
45. Treaty of Alliance Against Paraguay, May 1, 1865, Arg.-Braz.-Uru., art. 1, 131
Consol. T.S. 119, 120 (Fr.); Treaty of Union and Defensive Alliance,Jan. 23, 1865, art. 1,
130 Consol. T.S. 401, 402; Treaty of Alliance, July 10, 1865, 131 Consol. T.S. 305, 306
(Fr.); see also STOETZER, supra note 18, at 10, 266. A war with some of these states
sputtered on until the United States mediated an armistice in 1871. See Armistice, Apr.
11, 1871, 143 Consol. T.S. 129, 132.
46. Definitive Treaty of Peace, May 10, 1871, Fr.-Ger., 143 Consol. T.S. 163 (Fr.).
47. ROBERT H. FERRELL, PEACE IN THEIR TIME: THE ORIGINS OF THE KELLOGG-BRIAND
PACT 5-6 (1968), referring to Hague Convention (III) Relative to Opening of Hostilities,
Oct. 18, 1907, arts. 1, 3, 36 Stat. 2259, 2271 [hereinafter Hague III].
48. Hague Convention (II) Respecting Limitation of Employment of Force for Recov-
ery of Contract Debts, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 1, Stat. 2241, 2251 [hereinafter Hague I].
49. TAYLOR, supra note 18, at 255.
50. GADDIS, supra note 34, at 222 (notes that the simpler alliance systems of the Cold
War era, coinciding with much of the Charter era, are more durable than those of the
past century, which depended on the skill of a Metternich or Bismarck to hold them
together).
51. For analysis of alliance systems since World War II in the context of collective
self-defense, see infra notes 253-329 and accompanying text. See also George K. Walker,
Integration and Disintegration in Europe: Reordering the Treaty Map of the Continent, 6
TRANSNAT'L LAW. 1, 12-24 (1993) (surveying development of European economic sys-
tems, particularly the European Union).
52. Agreement, May 25-June 6, 1873, Aus.-Hung. - Russ., 146 Consol. T.S. 217 (to
which Germany acceded Oct. 22, 1873). See 2 KEY TREATIES, supra note 18, at 508;
PALMER, supra note 15, at 151.
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A special convention would be necessary to undertake military action.5 3
In 1878, Britain concluded a Defensive Alliance with Turkey, which was
directed against Russian aggression. 54 In 1879 Austria-Hungary and Ger-
many negotiated a Treaty of Alliance aimed at Russia. If Russia attacked
either party alone or "by an active co-operation or by military measures
which constitute a menace to the Party attacked," the other must assist
"with the whole war strength of their Empires."5 5 It was "the first perma-
nent arrangement in peace-time between two Great Powers since the end of
the ancien regime."'5 6 Two years later, the three empires were on the same
side and pledged that, if one party were at war with a fourth Great Power,
the others would maintain "benevolent neutrality."5 7 At about the same
time, Chile fought Bolivia and Peru in the Pacific War, which resulted in
loss of Bolivia's coast and Peruvian territory. The defensive alliance
between the two states pledged defense against "all foreign aggression" or
acts designed to deprive a party of sovereignty and independence.58
Treaties to isolate France began with the Treaty of the Triple Alliance
(Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Italy, 1882), which was "one of the most
stable and important of the European alignments" until 1915. 5 9 If France
attacked either Italy or Germany, or if one or two signatories were attacked
"without provocation" and were at war with two or more other Powers, then
53. Agreement, supra note 52, arts. 2-3, 146 Consol. T.S. 220-21.
54. Convention of Defensive Alliance, June 4, 1878, Gr. Brit.-Turk., art. 1, 153 Con-
sol. T.S. 67, 69.
55. Treaty of Alliance, Oct. 7, 1879, Aus.-Hung. - Ger., arts. 1-2, 155 Consol. T.S.
303, 307 (extended for five years by Protocol in Regard to Prolongation of Alliance of
1879, Mar. 22, 1883, reprinted in 2 KEY TREA-nEs, supra note 18, at 629). Protocol Con-
cerning Continuation of Treaty of 1879 and Protocol of 1883,June 1, 1902, Aus.-Hung. -
Ger., 155 Consol. T.S. at 732 extending the arrangement indefinitely on a three-year
renewal basis.
56. TAYLOR, supra note 18, at 264. See also WILLIAM L. LANGER, EUROPEAN ALLIANCES
AND ALIGNMENrs 171-96 (1931) [hereinafter LANGER, EUROPEAN ALLIANCES]; PALMER, supra
note 15, at 163-66 (discussing negotiations between French and Russian officials from
1870-1880).
57. This provision applied if a party were at war with Turkey, but only after previous
agreement among the three states. League of the Three Emperors, June 18, 1881, art. 1,
158 Consol. T.S. 471. A treaty extended and slightly modified the 1881 agreement.
Treaty Concerning Prolongation of Treaty of 1881, Apr. 15, 1884, reprinted in 2 KEY
TREA-rms, supra note 18, at 634. The parties pledged friendly neutrality if either was at
war. See Treaty of Alliance, June 16/28, 1881, Aus.-Hung. - Serbia, 159 Consol. T.S. 10,
extended to 1895 by Treaty Prolonging the Treaty of 1881, Jan. 28-Feb. 9, 1889, Aus.-
Hung. - Serbia, 171 Consol. T.S. 485. The three empires pledged reciprocal "loyal and
absolute neutrality" if either was involved in war with a third state; the treaty did not
apply to the Balkans. Declaration Affirming Engagement of Mutual Neutrality, Oct. 2-
Oct. 15, 1904, Aus.-Hung. - Russ., 196 Consol. T.S. 392, 394. For analysis of the League,
supra, see LANGER, EUROPEAN ALLIANCEs, supra note 56, at 196-212; TAYLOR, supra note
18, at 5, 272-79, 304 (arguing the League was a "fair-weather system" that "worked only
so long as there was no conflict").
58. Treaty of Defensive Alliance, Feb. 6, 1873, Bol.-Peru, art. 1, 145 Consol. T.S. 475,
484, and Protocol, May 5, 1879, 145 Consol. T.S. 482. See also Treaty of Peace and
Amity, Oct. 20, 1883, Chile-Peru, 162 Consol. T.S. 458; Armistice Convention, Apr. 4,
1884, Bol.-Chile, 163 Consol. T.S. 423; STo~zER, supra note 18, at 10, 266.
59. LANGER, EUROPEAN ALILANCES, supra note 56, at 246.
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the other had to join the conflict. 60 Articles 4 and 5 provided:
[If] a Great Power nonsignatory to the... Treaty should threaten the security
of the states of one ... Partly], and the threatened Party should find itself
forced on that account to make war against it, the two others bind them-
selves to observe towards their Ally a benevolent neutrality. Each . . .
reserves to itself, in this case, the right to take part in the war, if it should see
fit, to make common cause with its Ally.
•. . If the peace of any... Part[y] should chance to be threatened under the
circumstances foreseen by ... Articles [1-4], the ... Parties shall take coun-
sel together in ample time as to the military measures to be taken with a view
to eventual co-operation.
Secrecy was pledged; 6 1 this was among many "secret" treaties of the era,62
which were not truly secret, being so only for specific terms. In their
"secrecy" they were actually "engines of publicity."63
60. Treaty of Alliance, May 20, 1882, arts. 2-3, 160 Consol. T.S. 237, 241.
61. Id. arts. 4-6, 160 Consol. T.S. at 241, renewed by Second Treaty of Triple Alli-
ance, Feb. 20, 1887, art. 1, 169 Consol. T.S. 139, 141. Separate Treaty, Feb. 20, 1887,
Aus.-Hung. - Italy, 169 Consol. T.S. 143. Another treaty required Germany to go to war
if Italy went to war to protect its African interests. Separate Treaty, Feb. 20, 1887, Ger.-
Italy, 169 Consol. T.S. 147. Germany and Russia signed the Reinsurance Treaty, June
18, 1887, arts. 1-2, Ger.-Russ., 169 Consol. T.S. 317 (pledging that if either went to war
with a third Great Power, the other would observe "benevolent neutrality"). The treaty
also recognized Russia's interest in the Balkan peninsula and that the Straits of the Bos-
porus and Dardanelles should always remain open. Id. See Additional Protocol, June 18,
1887, Ger.-Russ., 169 Consol. T.S. 323-24 (providing that Germany would help Russia
establish a regular government in Bulgaria, and that Germany would be a benevolent
neutral if Russia was required to defend the entrance to the Black Sea). The Reinsurance
Treaty, supra, was allowed to lapse in 1890. See PALMER, supra note 15, at 179. A third
Triple Alliance was negotiated in Treaty of Alliance, May 6, 1891, 175 Consol. T.S. 105.
See also Fourth Treaty of Triple Alliance, June 28, 1902, art. 14, 191 Consol. T.S. 286,
295 (renewing the alliance for six years, with a possibility of a further six-year renewal);
Agreement Explaining and Supplementing Article VII of the Treaty of Triple Alliance of
1887, Dec. 15, 1909, Aus.-Hung. - Italy, reprinted in 2 KEY TREATIEs, supra note 18, at 812
(dealing with Balkan issues); Fifth Treaty of Triple Alliance, Dec. 5, 1912, 217 Consol.
T.S. 311 (renewing the alliance for the last time). The 1882 treaty's operative terms,
arts. 1-5, remained the same throughout.
62. For example, the Secret Protocol, Nov. 15, 1818, 69 Consol. T.S. 369, among the
victors of the Napoleonic wars, had a Military Protocol, id. at 374, and was signed the
same day the published treaty, Protocol of Conference, supra note 22, admitted France
to the Concert of Europe. See also supra notes 14-25 and accompanying text. Article 18
of the Covenant of the League of Nations required that League Members' future treaties
be registered with the League Secretariat and be published by it. No treaty would be
binding until registered. This superseded terms like article 6 of the Treaty of Alliance
and state practice. See Treaty of Alliance, May 20, 1882, art. 6, 160 Consol. T.S. 241.
"Open covenants of peace openly arrived at" had been the first of President Woodrow
Wilson's Fourteen Points, however, Covenant Members soon ignored art. 18. See FER-
RELL, supra note 47, at 54-61. Article 102 of the U.N. Charter admonishes Members to
submit their treaties for registration; a consequence for nonfulfillment is that a treaty
cannot be invoked before a U.N. organ. See GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 5, at 610-14;
SiMMa, supra note 1, at 1103-16. Security agreements are often not published. RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF THE UNITED STATES FOREIGN RELATIONs LAW § 312 r.n.5 (1987) [hereinaf-
ter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
63. TAYLOR, supra note 18, at 264.
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In 1883, Romania and Austria-Hungary agreed that if either was
attacked "without provocation," an obligation on the other would arise. If
either was "threatened by an aggression under [these] ... conditions," the
governments would confer, and a military convention would govern opera-
tions.6 4 Germany acceded to this treaty, as did Italy.
6 5
The third Triple Alliance 6 6 resulted in the formation of the Entente
Cordiale between France and Russia. In an exchange of notes, France and
Russia agreed that if "peace should be actually in danger, and especially if
... [a] part[y] should be threatened with an aggression, the two parties
undertake to reach an understanding on measures whose immediate and
simultaneous adoption would be imposed upon the two Governments by
the realization of this eventuality." 67 A Military Convention followed in
1892, providing that if either the Triple Alliance forces or an Alliance state
should mobilize, France and Russia, "at the first news of the event and
without the necessity of any previous concert, shall mobilize immediately
and simultaneously the whole of their forces and shall move them ... to
their frontiers" 68 to force a two-front war. Respective general staffs would
cooperate to prepare and facilitate execution of these measures. 69 These
terms were generally not known, but most diplomats considered France
64. Romania had to aid Austria-Hungary only if it was attacked in territory of states
bordering Romania. Treaty of Alliance, Oct. 30, 1883, Aus.-Hung. - Rom., arts. 2-3, 162
Consol. T.S. 488, 491.
65. Germany accepted the treaty verbatim; Italy required consultation before action.
Treaty Providing for Accession of Germany, Oct. 30, 1883, 162 Consol. T.S. 487, 493;
Treaty Providing for Accession of Italy, May 15, 1888, 171 Consol. T.S. 61; Treaty of
Alliance, July 13-25, 1892, Aus.-Hung. - Rom., 177 Consol. T.S. 273 (renewing the rela-
tionship). Germany and Italy acceded. Treaty Providing for Accession of Germany to
the Alliance, Nov. 11-12, 1892, 178 Consol. T.S. 17; Treaty Providing for Accession of
Italy to the Alliance, Nov. 28, 1892, 128 Consol. T.S. 39; Protocol, Sept. 30, 1896, 183
Consol. T.S. 379 (extending the alliance to 1903). Germany and Italy acceded. Acces-
sion of Germany, May 7, 1899, id. at 383; Accession of Italy, June 5, 1899, 183 Consol.
T.S. 389. The relationship was extended by the Third Treaty Renewing Alliances of 1892
and 1896, Apr. 4-17, 1902, Aus.-Hung. - Rom., 191 Consol. T.S. 117; Treaty Providing
for Accession of Germany to the Alliance, July 12-25, 1902, reprinted in 2 KEY TREA-rEs,
supra note 18, at 729; Treaty Providing for Accession of Italy to the Alliance, Dec. 12,
1902, Aus.-Hung. - Italy, reprinted in 2 KEY TRFA-nEs, supra note 18, at 730. The relation-
ship was extended by Treaty Renewing the Alliances of 1892, 1896, and 1903, Feb. 5,
1913, 217 Consol. T.S. 384; Treaty Providing for Accession of Germany to the Alliance,
Feb. 13-26, 217 Consol. T.S. 390; and Treaty Providing for Accession of Italy, Mar. 5,
1913, Aus.-Hung. -Italy, 217 Consol. T.S. 393.
66. Treaty of Alliance, May 20, 1882, 160 Consol. T.S. 237. See also supra notes 59-
63.
67. Note from Russian Ambassador to France M. de Mohrenheim to French Foreign
Minister M. Ribot, Aug. 15-27, 1891, annexing Letter of Russian Foreign Affairs Minister
Nikolai Giers to de Mohrenheim, Aug. 9-21, 1891; Note of Ribot to de Mohrenheim, Aug.
27, 1891, reprinted in 2 KEY TREA-Es, supra note 18, at 662-65.
68. Draft of Military Convention, 1892, Fr.-Russ., art. 2, reprinted in 2 KEY TREADnS,
supra note 18, at 669, approved by Note of Giers to French Ambassador to Russia M. de
Montbello, Dec. 15-27, 1893, id. at 669. For diplomatic history analysis, see 1 WILLIAM
L. LANGER, THE DIPLOMACY OF IMPERIALISM 1890-1912 chs. 1-2 (1935) [hereinafter
LANGER, DIPLOMACY]; TAYLOR, supra note 18, ch. 15.
69. See Draft of Military Convention, reprinted in 2 KEY TREAnEs, supra note 18, at
668-69.
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and Russia partners. 70 Britain joined the Entente by separate arrange-
ments with France (1904)71 and Russia (1907)72 but signed no formal
defense alliances, despite Russia's desire that it do so. 73 In 1906, however,
Britain began unofficial military and naval conversations with France. 74
A 1904 Bulgaria-Serbia alliance, directed against Turkey, "promise[d]
to oppose, with all the power and resources at their command, any hostile
act or . . .occupation of four Balkan provinces."75 The alliance also
pledged joint defense "against any encroachment from any source ... on
the present territorial unity .... *76 If either event happened, the allies
would conclude a special military convention. 77 In 1912, these countries
negotiated the same arrangement and this time included a military conven-
tion.78 Bulgaria also negotiated an alliance with Greece; it provided that if
either "should be attacked by Turkey, either on its territory or through sys-
tematic disregard of its rights, based on treaties or on the fundamental
principles of international law," the other would assist the defense.79 Simi-
larly, in 1913, Greece and Serbia signed an alliance and military conven-
tion providing that if "one of the two ... should be attacked without any
provocation on its part," the other would assist with all of its armed
70. See PALMER, supra note 15, at 180.
71. See id. at 203; TAYLOR, supra note 18, ch. 18 (analyzing Declaration Respecting
Egypt and Morocco, Apr. 8, 1904, Fr.-Gr. Brit., 195 Consol. T.S. 198); Convention
Respecting Newfoundland and West and Central Africa, Apr. 8, 1904, Fr.-Gr. Brit., 195
Consol. T.S. at 205. See also KAGAN, supra note 22, at 177-78.
72. See PALMER, supra note 15, at 211. See also TAYLOR, supra note 18, at 427-46
(analyzing Convention Relating to Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet, Aug. 31, 1907, Gr.
Brit.-Russ., 204 Consol. T.S. 404).
73. See TAYLOR, supra note 18, at 511. Only after the Great War began did Britain,
France and Russia sign the Pact of London, Sept. 5, 1914, Gr.Brit.-Fr.-Russ., 220 Consol.
T.S. 330 (pledging continuing the conflict until a satisfactory peace could be obtained).
See also PALMER, supra note 15, at 232.
74. KAGAN, supra note 22, at 150-51; PALMER, supra note 15, at 209. DON CooK,
FORGING THE ALLIANCE 75 (1989), claims Britain's first peacetime defensive alliance was
Treaty of Dunkirk, Mar. 4, 1947, Fr.-U.K., 9 U.N.T.S. 187. However, the United King-
dom, in effect, allied with other states in Treaty of Alliance and Friendship, supra note
19, to enforce the Congress of Vienna system, the Nyon Arrangement, Sept. 14, 1937,
181 L.N.T.S. 135, and Arrangement Supplementary to the Nyon Arrangement, Sept. 17,
1937, id. at 149, and with Poland just before World War II. See supra notes 14-25; infra
notes 163-68, 183, 263-69, 315 and accompanying text. While Cook's statement is tech-
nically correct, the effect of these treaties was a defense alliance in each case.
75. Treaty of Alliance, Mar. 30, 1904, Bulg.-Serb., art. 3, reprinted in 2 KEY TREATIES,
supra note 18, at 752.
76. Id. art. 2.
77. Id. art. 4.
78. Treaty of Amity and Alliance, Feb. 29-Mar. 13, 1912, Bulg.-Serb., 215 Consol.
T.S. 390; Military Convention, Bulg.-Serb., Apr. 29-May 11, 1912, reprinted in 2 KEY
TR.AEIES, supra note 18, at 822. An Alliance, Sept. 12-Oct. 6, 1912, Monteneg.-Serb.,
reprinted in 2 KEY TREATIES, supra note 18, at 828, included a decision in the Political
Convention, art. 4, reprinted in 2 KEY TREATIES, supra note 18, at 829, to go to war with
Turkey. Articles 1 and 2 of the Military Convention provided for strategic defensive in
war with Austria-Hungary and strategic offensive in war with Turkey. See The Military
Convention, arts. 1-2, reprinted in 2 KEY TRATIES, supra note 18, at 829.
79. Treaty of Defensive Alliance, May 16-29, 1912, Bulg.-Ger., art. 1, 216 Consol.
T.S. 179. See also Military Convention, Sept. 12, 1912, Bulg.-Ger., reprinted in 2 KEY
TREATIES, supra note 18, at 830.
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forces.80
In 1911, despite its reticence to commit in Europe,8 1 Britain con-
cluded a defensive alliance with Japan; the treaty contained the almost
standard articles for prior consultation, armed common defense upon
unprovoked attack or aggressive action by a third state, with a military and
naval arrangement to follow, and periodic military consultations. 8 2
C. Analysis
This labyrinth of agreements did not prevent the Great War.8 3 Neither the
Hague ultimatum system,8 4 nor the language of these treaties, which
pledged reactive self-defense and the possibility for anticipatory self-
defense, could stop mobilizations and war declarations.8 5 The application
of military force and the failure to properly use diplomacy through trea-
ties,8 6 as opposed to the self-defense provisions in such treaties, led to the
cataclysm.
The treaties of 1815-1914 were not drafted with today's concepts of
self-defense, anticipatory self-defense, or collective self-defense in mind.
They have been superseded by the Pact of Paris insofar as they justify resort
to offensive war as national policy,87 and by the Covenant and the Charter
as to their secrecy provisions.88 They were conditioned by the 1907 Hague
Conventions.89 Nevertheless, several principles emerged, including the
concept of collective (multilateral and bilateral) self-defense. Many treaties
had general statements requiring prior consultation. 90 Although most
spoke of reactive self-defense, that is, the contemporary "restrictive view" of
awaiting a first attack before responding, some contemplated anticipatory
response.9 '
80. Treaty of Alliance, May 19-June 1, 1913, Ger.-Serb., art. 1, 218 Consol. T.S. 166,
167 (Fr.); Military Convention, May 19-June 1, 1913, 218 Consol. T.S. 170 (Fr.). See
also Protocol Concerning Conclusion of Treaty of Alliance, Apr. 22-May 5, 1913, 218
Consol. T.S. 117. The Second Balkan War ended with Treaty of Peace, May 30, 1913,
218 Consol. T.S. 159; Treaty of Peace, July 28-Aug. 10, 1913, 218 Consol. T.S. 322.
81. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
82. Agreement Respecting Rights in Eastern Asia and India, Gr. Brit.-Japan, July 13,
1911, arts. 1-3, 5, 214 Consol. T.S. 107-08. See also 2 LANGER, DIPLOMACY, supra note 68,
ch. 23. Japan's navy contributed appreciably to the Allied war effort in the Indian and
Pacific Oceans and the Mediterranean Sea, where three destroyer flotillas operated
under U.K. command. PAUL G. HALPERN, A NAVAL HISTORY OF WORLD WAR 1 18-19, 75,
80, 82, 85, 90-91, 95-96, 372-73, 393 (1994).
83. KAGAN, supra note 22, at 128-29. But see TAYLOR, supra note 18, at 527-28.
84. Hague III, supra note 47, arts. 1, 3, 36 Stat. 2251. See also supra note 47 and
accompanying text.
85. See generally PALMER, supra note 15, at 226-30; TAYLOR, supra note 18, at 520-30;
BARBARA TUCHmAN, THE GUNS OF AUGUST 91-157 (1962).
86. TAYLOR, supra note 18, at 527-28.
87. Pact of Paris, supra note 11, arts. 1-2, 46 Stat. 2345-46, 94 L.N.T.S. 63. See also
infra notes 136-52 and accompanying text.
88. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
89. Hague II, supra note 48, art. 1, 36 Stat. 2251; Hague III, supra note 47, arts. 1, 3,
36 Stat. 2271.
90. See supra notes 19, 24, 28, 41, 45, 61, 64-65, 67, 82 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 24-25, 28-42, 45, 56, 67-72, 75, 82 and accompanying text.
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This is particularly true in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars,
where the victors established a Congress system with a multilateral defense
treaty incorporating consultation and anticipatory self-defense princi-
ples.9 2 The Crimean War illustrates a characteristic response to a regional
conflict under this treaty. States opposing Russia agreed to conduct prior
consultation and to try to contain the conflict by warning Russia, at least
on paper, of consequences of expanding the war. Peripheral treaties, such
as that with Sweden, were anticipatory in nature, warning Russia of conse-
quences of wider action.93 In a very rough sense, between the Congress
and the Crimea systems, the forerunner of the treaty system in place since
World War II emerged: an overarching instrument like the Charter, 9 4
regional multilaterals like the North Atlantic Treaty, 95 and bilaterals 96 else-
where around the world.
The record for anticipatory self-defense in the pre-World War I treaties
is mixed. Treaty drafters who included anticipatory self-defense provisions
laid groundwork for state practice 97 and invoked the provisions as author-
ity98 for officials executing those treaties. Use of anticipatory self-defense
provisions strengthened the view that anticipatory self-defense was a fea-
ture of international law before 1914.
II. The Covenant of the League of Nations and the Pact of Paris
The League of Nations Covenant and the 1928 Pact of Paris, also known as
the Kellogg-Briand Pact, created the principal governing instruments of
international security during the interwar years, 1920-39. These treaties,
including the self-defense reservation to the Pact of Paris and other agree-
92. See supra notes 28-38 and accompanying text.
93. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
94. See infra Parts III.A, III.B for analysis of self-defense in the Charter era.
95. North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243, modified by
Protocol on Accession of Greece and Turkey, Oct. 17, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 43, 126 U.N.T.S.
350; Protocol on Accession of Federal Republic of Germany, Oct. 23, 1954, 6 U.S.T.
5707, 243 U.N.T.S. 308; Protocol on Accession of Spain, Dec. 10, 1981, 34 U.S.T. 3510
(analyzed infra notes 270-72 and accompanying text). In 1997, agreements were signed
to admit the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland to Treaty membership, with perhaps
other states to follow in a second round. The protocol was recently accepted by the U.S.
Senate. Predictably, the Department of State promoted the expansion; others are critical
of it. See generally U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, NATO Expansion:
Beginning the Process of Advice and Consent: Statement Before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, 8 U.S. Dep't St. Dispatch 1 (Oct. 1997) (favoring expansion); Madeleine K.
Albright, NATO Expansion: A Shared and Sensible Investment: Statement Before the Senate
Appropriations Committee, 8 U.S. Dep't St. Dispatch 12 (Nov. 1997) (same); MANDEL-
BAum, supra note 22, at 45-65, 156, 164, 173-74 (opposing expansion); Amos Perlmutter
& Ted Galen Carpenter, NATO's Expensive Trip East, 77 FOREIGN AFF. 2 (1998) (same).
On April 30, 1998, the Senate voted 80-19 to admit the Czech Republic, Hungary and
Poland to NATO. See Steven Erlanger, Key Senate Panel Passes Resolution to Broaden
NATO, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1998, at Al; Eric Schmitt, Senate Approves Expansion of NATO
by Vote of 80-19; Efforts at Delay Defeated, N.Y. TIMEs, May 1, 1998, at Al.
96. See infra notes 305-15 and accompanying text.
97. See, e.g., supra note 25 and accompanying text.
98. Cf. 1945 I.CJ. 59 Stat. 1055, art. 38(1); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 62,
§§ 102-03.
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ments negotiated before World War II, along with the views of commenta-
tors, demonstrates that anticipatory collective self-defense remained a
legitimate response under international law.
A. The Covenant of the League of Nations
The Covenant of the League of Nations, a part of the World War I peace
treaties,99 created treaty law that could be applied territorially' 00 to League
Members, their colonies, and their dependencies, 101 thus covering signifi-
cant portions of the world from 1920 through 1945. Major exceptions
include Germany (Member 1926-33); Japan (Member 1920-33); USSR
(Member 1934-39); and the United States (never a Member). 102
The Covenant's relatively weak principles for regulating the use of
force did not address self-defense issues directly. Its preamble directed its
members "to achieve international peace and security.., accept... obliga-
tions not to resort to war ... [and] Agree to [the] Covenant .... -103 Cove-
nant article 10 provided:
... Members ... undertake to respect and preserve as against external
aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all
Members .... In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or
danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by
which this obligation shall be fulfilled. 104
The Council included the Principal Allied and Associated Powers from
World War I - France, Great Britain, Italy, and Japan - and four more
League Members. 10 5 Article 11 provided for League action in case of war
or threat of war:
99. See F.P. WALTERS, A HISTORY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS ch. 4 (1952) for analysis
of drafting of the Covenant. See also supra note 10 and accompanying text.
100. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 29, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, 339 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (restating customary rule that unless a differ-
ent intention appears from a treaty or is otherwise established, a treaty binds a party as
to all its territory)); IAN SINCLmiR, THE VIENNA CONvEN-ION ON THE LAW of: TREATIES 89-92
(2d ed. 1984); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 62, § 322 & r.n. 2 (noting colonial
empires' practice to specify territorial application).
101. LEAGUE OF NATIONS CovENANT art. 1, provided that original Members were states
signatory to the Treaty of Versailles, supra note 10, of which the Covenant was Part I, and
other states named in the Covenant Annex, for example, countries like the Netherlands
neutral during the war. Other states, dominions or colonies could join if the Assembly
approved. See WALTERS, supra note 99, at 43-44. For the Assembly's function, see infra
notes 111-14 and accompanying text. The United States signed the Treaty of Versailles,
but the Senate never gave advice and consent. See WALTmS, supra, ch. 6; supra note 10
and accompanying text.
102. Costa Rica, an original Member, withdrew in 1925, and Brazil and Spain in
1926. WALTERS, supra note 99, at 68-72, 316-27, 495-97, 550, 565, 579-85, 768, 782-83,
806-08.
103. LEAGUE OF NATIONS CovENANT art. 4(1).
104. Id. art. 10.
105. Id. For President Woodrow Wilson, article 10 was the Covenant's key provision.
KAGAN, supra note 22, at 299; WALTERS, supra note 99, at 48-49. The United States was
also mentioned but never joined the League. See supra notes 10, 101 and accompanying
text.
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1. Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any ..
Members... or not, is... declared a matter of concern to the whole League,
and [it] shall take any action ... deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the
peace of nations. [If] any such emergency should arise the Secretary Gen-
eral shall on the request of any Member... forthwith summon a meeting of
the Council.
2. It is also . . . the friendly right of each Member... to bring to the
attention of the Assembly or ... Council any circumstance whatever affect-
ing international relations which threatens to disturb international peace or
the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends. 10 6
The Assembly included representatives of all Members; the Secretary-Gen-
eral had functions similar to the U.N. Secretary-General. 10 7 Members also
agreed to resolve disputes by arbitration, judicial settlement, or resolution
by the Council or the Assembly.10 8 If a Member resorted to war in disre-
gard of these covenants, it was "ipso facto. .. deemed to have committed an
act of war against all other Members," thereby triggering economic and
even military sanctions, if recommended by the Council. 10 9 The offending
Member could not invoke treaties it did not register with the League, and
the Assembly was charged with examining registered agreements for risks
to peace. 110 The Covenant was silent on options if the Council did not
recommend action, or if it did and Members failed to comply.
The similarity to articles 1(1) and 2(4) of the Charter in Covenant
articles 10 and 11 regarding threats to the peace or threats against any
state are noteworthy:
Article 1
The Purposes of the United Nations are:
1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to
take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to
the peace and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of
the peace ....
Article 2
The Organisation and its Members, in pursuit of the purposes ... in
Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following principles: ...
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political indepen-
dence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of
the United Nations. 111
106. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 11.
107. Id. arts. 3, 6, 11. See also U.N. CHARTER arts. 97-101; GooDRIcH ET AL., supra note
5, ch. 15; WALeRS, supra note 99, at 44-47, 49.
108. LEAGUE OF NArnONS COVENANT arts. 12-13, 15. See also WATRS, supra note 99,
at 49-53.
109. LEAGUE OF NAIONS CoVENANT arts. 16(1)-16(2). See also WALaES, supra note
99, at 53.
110. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT arts. 18-19, which countered treaty terms of the
previous era, which often enjoined secrecy on parties. See also WAERS, supra note 99,
at 54-55; supra note 62 and accompanying text.
111. U.N. CHARTER arts. 1(1), 2(4). Cf. LEAGUE OF NA-nONS COVENANT arts. 10-11.
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Besides safeguarding Members' territorial integrity against external aggres-
sion, Covenant article 10 also referred to "threat or danger of such aggres-
sion."112 Under article 11(1), "war or threat of war, whether immediately
affecting" a Member was declared a League concern, and the League could
take "any action" deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of
nations. 113 Article 11(2) allowed a Member to bring forward "any circum-
stance whatever affecting international relations which threatens to disturb
international peace .... -114
The Covenant drafters thus considered more than war declarations or
outbreak of war. The Covenant, like the Charter a quarter century later,
contemplated action against threats or dangers of aggression, threats of
war, or "any circumstance whatever... threatening to disturb international
peace."1 15 Article 16(1) declared that a Member's resort to war in violation
of certain Covenant obligations would automatically result in that Mem-
ber's action being "deemed ... an act of war against all other Members
.I.."116 Under treaty interpretation canons, 117 the Covenant, weak as it
was in terms of enforcement, contemplated collective action to counter hos-
tile intent and hostile action.
Although the Covenant did not mention individual or collective self-
defense, other Treaty of Versailles provisions prohibited Germany from
maintaining or fortifying certain parts of the banks of the Rhine.1 18 Main-
taining armed forces, permanently or temporarily stationed there, or per-
manent mobilization works, was also forbidden. 1 19 If Germany violated
these provisions, she would "be regarded as committing a hostile act
against the Powers signatory [to] the... Treaty and as calculated to disturb
the peace of the world."120 This constitutes a statement of a potential for
anticipatory collective self-defense. Unratified bilateral agreements
between France and the United States, and France and Great Britain, con-
firm this view.12 1 These agreements called for Great Britain and the
United States to come immediately to the aid of France if Germany com-
112. LEAGUE Op NATIONS CovENAN art. 10.
113. Id. art. 11, 1.
114. Id. art. 11, cl 2.
115. Id.
116. Id. art. 16, '1 1.
117. Vienna Convention, supra note 100, art. 31(1), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340 (treaty
interpreted in good faith in accordance with ordinary meaning given terms in their con-
text and in light of its object and purpose). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 62,
§ 325(1); Eduardo Jimenez de Arechaga, International Law in the Past Third of a Century,
159 R.C.A.D.I. 1, 42-48 (1978).
118. Treaty of Versailles, supra note 10, 42 Stat. 1939.
119. Id.
120. Id. arts. 42-44, 225 Consol. T.S. at 213.
121. Agreement Providing for Assistance to France in the Event of Unprovoked
Aggression by Germany, June 28, 1919, Fr.-U.S., arts. 1-2, 112 Brit. & For. St. Pap. 216-
17, 13 AM.J. INT'L L. 411-13 (Supp. 1919) [hereinafter Agreement Providing U.S. Assist-
ance to France]; Agreement for Assistance to France in the Event of Unprovoked Aggres-
sion by Germany, June 28, 1919, Fr.-Gr. Brit., arts. 1-2, 112 Brit. & For. St. Pap. 213-14,
13 Am. J. IW'L L. 414-15 (Supp. 1919) [hereinafter Agreement Providing British Assist-
ance to France] (signed the same day as Treaty of Versailles, supra note 10).
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mitted "any unprovoked movement of aggression against her.'u 22 Because
these agreements came into effect only if Britain and the United States rati-
fied respective bilaterals with France, U.S. failure to ratify the Treaty 123
torpedoed the bilaterals, including the France-U.K. agreement that was rati-
fied by Britain and thus was in force. 124 Nevertheless, use of troop "move-
ment" limitations in these treaties, and the Versailles Treaty language,
proves that the treaty drafters considered anticipatory collective self-
defense action as an option. Available evidence of the secret military con-
vention between France and Poland (1921)125 suggests that it, too, contem-
plated anticipatory self-defense, as did the France-Czechoslovakia alliance
(1924).126 In contrast, eastern European states' alliances, which created
the Little Entente, only provided for reactive self-defense. 127
In 1931, League Assembly reports, including one officially adopted by
the Assembly, confirmed that the Covenant's prohibition on recourse to
war did not exclude legitimate self-defense. 128 Principal League Members
122. Agreement Providing British Assistance to France, supra note 121, art. 1, at 415;
Agreement Providing U.S. Assistance to France, supra note 121, preamble, at 411-12.
123. See supra notes 10, 101-05 and accompanying text.
124. KAGAN, supra note 22, at 297-98; George A. Finch, A Pact of Non-Aggression, 27
Am.J. INT'L L. 525, 526 (1933). LEAGUE OF NATIONS CovENANT art. 21, also provided that
nothing in the Covenant would be deemed to affect "validity of international agreements,
such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for
securing the maintenance of peace." Article 21 was inserted to try to assure U.S. Senate
passage of the Treaty of Versailles, supra note 10. WALTERS, supra note 99, at 55-56.
President Wilson and British Prime Minister David Lloyd George agreed, in exchange, to
the treaties, see supra note 121, that pledged aid to France if Germany attacked her
again. Latin American states were not happy with the Monroe Doctrine reference. Id.
125. Secret Military Convention, Feb. 21, 1921, Fr.-Pol., art. 1, reprinted in J.A.S.
GRENVILLE, THE MAJOR INTERNATIONAL TREATES 191445, at 116 (1987).
126. Treaty of Alliance, Jan. 21, 1924, Czech.-Fr., arts. 1-2, reprinted in GRENVILLE,
supra note 125, at 117. See also Political Agreement, Feb. 19, 1921, Fr.-Pol., reprinted in
GRENVILLE, supra note 125, at 116. These agreements were modified by revised alliances
(1925) negotiated in connection with Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, Oct. 16, 1925, 54
L.N.T.S. 289 [hereinafter Locarno Treaty], analyzed infra at notes 130-35 and accompa-
nying text. See also KAGAN, supra note 22, at 390.
127. See, e.g., Convention of Alliance, Aug. 14, 1920, Czech.-Yugo., art. 1, 6 L.N.T.S.
209, 211; Treaty of Alliance, Apr. 23, 1921, Czech.-Rom., art. 1, 13 L.N.T.S. 231, 233;
Convention of Defensive Alliance, June 7, 1921, Rom.-Yugo., art. 1, 54 L.N.T.S. 257, 259
(collective self-defense from "unprovoked attack"; also providing for consultation); THE-
ODORE I. GESHKOFF, BALKAN UNION: A ROAD TO PEACE IN SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE 62-63
(1940) (arguing that the Little Entente's weakness was that it did not provide for defense
to unprovoked attack by a great power); GRENVILLE, supra note 125 (Entente designed to
maintain the Treaties of Neuilly and Trianon, supra note 10.). France and Italy also
negotiated treaties with Entente states. See GRENVILLE, supra note 125, at 114-15; L.S.
STAvRIANos, BALKAN FEDERATION 227 (1964).
128. See 12 League of Nations Oj. 147-49 (1931) (adopting General Convention to
Improve the Means of Preventing War: Report of the Third Committee to the Assembly,
League of Nations Doc. A.77.1931.IX (1931), Annex 24, 24(a), 12 League of Nations
Oj. 237-38, 241); Third Committee, Draft Report to the Assembly, League of Nations
Doc. A.III.17.1931.IX (1931), Annex 3, 12 League of Nations Oj. Spec. Supp. 59-60
(1931); First Committee Minutes, 12 League of Nations Oj. Spec. Supp. 94, at 21-41,
73-74 (1931) (adopting Amendment of the Covenant of the League of Nations in Order to
Bring It into Harmony with the Pact of Paris, Annex 18, 12 League of Nations Oj. Spec.
Supp. 94, at 145, 146). See also 12 League of Nations Oj. Spec. Supp. 94, at 75, Obser-
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rejected a proposed Treaty of Mutual Guarantee that was open to all states,
whereby any party attacked would receive immediate, effective assistance
from other parties in the same part of the world, and the Protocol of
Geneva, which would have branded any state choosing war over arbitration
of a dispute as the aggressor, unless the Council decided otherwise.' 29
The right of self-defense became more explicit in reservations to the Pact of
Paris and in the authoritative interpretation of it. 1 30
B. Locarno, the Pact of Paris, the Budapest Articles and Other Treaties
In 1925, five powers - Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, and Italy
- signed the Locarno Treaties. Belgium and Germany, and France and
Germany, pledged that they would not attack or invade each other, or
resort to war against each other. This core Treaty of Mutual Guarantee
stated two exceptions for these undertakings: "legitimate defense" and
action by the parties to settle a conflict or stop an aggressor if the League
did not. Legitimate defense was defined as "resistance to a violation of the
undertaking" not to attack or invade, or resistance to flagrant breach of the
Versailles Treaty's demilitarization provisions, "if such breach constitutes
an unprovoked act of aggression and by reason of the assembly of armed
forces in the demilitarized zone immediate action is necessary."' 3 ' The
Locarno treaties also "created a system in the nature of collective self-
defense."' 32 The parties pledged "collectively and severally [to] guarantee
...maintenance of the territorial status quo [of] ...frontiers between
Germany and Belgium and between Germany and France, and the inviola-
bility of the said frontiers as fixed by" the Versailles Treaty.' 33 The parties
agreed to provide immediate assistance to the target state. 134 To the extent
that the Locarno parties agreed to act collectively for flagrant breaches of
the Versailles Treaty, Locarno could be said to restate anticipatory collec-
tive self-defense, in that failure to maintain a demilitarized area or demilita-
rized status could be deemed a hostile threat to other states permitting
vations Submitted by Governments, League of Nations Doc. A.11.1931.V (1931); Precis of
the Observations Submitted by the Governments Since the Assembly of 1930, 12 League of
Nations OJ. Spec. Supp. 94, at 92; ALEXANDROV, supra note 1, at 37.
129. See KAGAN, supra note 22, at 307; WAL.rms, supra note 99, at 223-27, 267-76,
283-85, 288, 291, 362, 384, 710.
130. See infra notes 136-52, 238-48 and accompanying text.
131. Locarno Treaty, supra note 126, art. 2, 54 L.N.T.S. at 293. See also ALExANDROV,
supra note 1, at 44-47; Bow-rr, supra note 1, at 127-29; KAGAN, supra note 22, at 308-15,
335, 355-57, 378; WALr-as, supra note 99, at 285-94, 692-98 (German denunciation of
Locarno, 1936); C.G. Fenwick, The Progress of Cooperative Defense, 24 Am. J. INT'L L.
118, 120 (1930) (France concluded guarantee treaties "of the old type" with Czechoslo-
vakia and Poland besides signing Locarno Treaties); C.G. Fenwick, The Legal Significance
of the Locarno Agreements, 20 AM.J. Ibr'L L. 108 (1926); Finch, supra note 124, at 727-28
(failure of multilateral 1924 Treaty of Mutual Assistance); Quincy Wright, The Munich
Settlement and International Law, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 12, 18 (1939) (German denunciation
of Locarno).
132. ALEXANDROV, supra note 1, at 45.
133. Locarno Treaty, supra note 126, art. 1, 54 L.N.T.S at 293.
134. A party claiming a violation had to bring the case to the League. Id. art. 4, 54
L.N.T.S. at 293.
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collective action. Although only five countries were formal parties, when
their colonial empires and associated states are considered, Locarno's ter-
ritorial scope was quite large. 13 5
Parties to the Pact of Paris (1928) renounced war as an instrument of
national policy, agreeing to settle disputes by pacific means. 13 6 The Pact is
still in force, though partly superseded by the Charter, 1 37 with sixty-nine
signatures by 1997.138 Further, treaty succession principles may apply it
to more states. 13 9 The Pact's principles became part of the Nuremberg
Charter140 and Judgment;14 1 they were also affirmed as customary inter-
national law by unanimous U.N. General Assembly Resolution 95(1).142
Although the Pact did not address self-defense, an understanding,
which was promoted by the United States 143 and to which fourteen major
135. Id. art. 9, 54 L.N.T.S. at 297. Article 9 specifically exempted the British Domin-
ions and India from any obligations under the treaty unless they assented. However, the
treaty said nothing about the then-extensive Belgian, French or Italian possessions or
other British colonies. Cf. Vienna Convention, supra note 100, art. 29, 1155 U.N.T.S. at
339. See also WATERs, supra note 99, ch. 24 (analyzing the Locarno treaties in the
context of the Covenant). Germany ended the arrangement in 1936 by denouncing the
Treaty. WAITERs, supra, at 692-98; Wright, The Munich, supra note 131.
136. Pact of Paris, supra note 11, arts. 1-2, 46 Stat. at 2345-46, 94 L.N.T.S. at 63. See
generally FERRELL, supra note 47, at 66-191; DAVID HUNTER MILLER, THE PE.ACE PACT OF
PARIs: A STUv or THE BRaLND-KELLOGG TREATY 7-120 (1928) (providing negotiating his-
tory). French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand reading CARL VON C.AusEwITz, ON WAR
(Michael Howard & Peter Paret ed. & trans. 1976) may have inspired the Pact. FERRELL,
supra, at 66.
137. U.N. CHARTER art. 103. See also Vienna Convention, supra note 100, art. 30(1),
1155 U.N.T.S. at 339; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 62, § 102 cmt. h, 323 cmt. b;
SINCLAIR, supra note 100, at 94-98, 184-85.
138. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TREA-nES IN FORCE 430-31 (1997) [hereinaf-
ter TIFI.
139. See generally Symposium, State Succession in the Former Soviet Union and in East-
ern Europe, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 253 (1993); Walker, Integration and Disintegration, supra
note 51, at 43.
140. Agreement for Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the Euro-
pean Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 2, 59 Stat. 1544-45, 82 U.N.T.S. 280, 282, annexing Char-
ter of International Military Tribunal, art. 6, 59 Stat. 1546, 1547, 82 U.N.T.S. at 286-88
[hereinafter Nuremberg Charter].
141. United States v. Goering, 1 Tr. Maj. War Crim. Before Int'l M. Trib. 171, 218-22
(1947), 41 Am. J. INT'L L. 172, 216 (1947) [hereinafter Nuremberg Judgment]. See also
McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 1, at 531, 533.
142. G.A. Res. 95(1), U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/236, at 1144 (1946). The
International Law Commission reiterated principles of the Pact, the Judgment, and the
Resolution. See International Law Commission, Formulation of the Nurnberg Principles,
2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 193, 195 (1950). See also discussion infra notes 238-48 and
accompanying text (providing further analysis of the war crimes trials and the 1946
Assembly resolution). 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, § 52fh, at 183, says resort to war is
lawful as between Pact parties and non-parties, and presumably a fortiori between two
states that are not Pact parties. But see supra notes 139-41, infra notes 238-48 and
accompanying text (noting that principles of treaty succession and acceptance of Pact
principles as a general customary norm makes this claim dubious today).
143. Multilateral Treaty for Renunciation of War: Identic Notes of the Government of
the United States to the Governments of Australia, et al.,June 23, 1928, 22 AM. J. INT'L L.
109 (1928). See also MILLER, supra note 136, at 80-98; WALTERs, supra note 99, at 385-
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signatories including the colonial powers' 44 agreed, 145 stated that the
treaty did not affect the "inalienable" right of self-defense. The notes
exchanged between these major signatories were "an authentic and binding
commentary on and interpretation of the ... Treaty."146 Although the dip-
lomatic correspondence made no specific reference to anticipatory self-
defense or collective self-defense, Great Britain nonetheless broadly
claimed that:
[T]here are certain regions... the welfare and integrity of which constitute a
special and vital interest for our peace and safety. His Majesty's Govern-
ment have been at pains to make it clear in the past that interference with
these regions cannot be suffered. Their protection against attack is to the...
Empire a measure of self-defense. It must be clearly understood that...
Britain accept[s] the new treaty upon the distinct understanding that it does
not prejudice their freedom of action in this respect.14 7
Britain was referring to its Empire, Egypt and the Persian Gulf.148 A few
states objected to the British note. For example, the USSR stated that "the
result would be that there would probably be no place left... where the
Pact could be applied."149 Since the Commonwealth system included colo-
144. The result was that the Pact applied to most of the Earth's territory. Cf. Vienna
Convention, supra note 100, art. 29, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 339; supra note 100 and accompa-
nying text.
145. See 1928(1) FoR. Rats. U.S. 107-24 (1942). See also telegram of U.S. Secretary of
State Frank B. Kellogg to Myron T. Herrick, U.S. Ambassador to France, June 20, 1928 in
1928(1) FoR. RaLs. U.S. 90, 91. Secretary Kellogg had made nearly verbatim but unoffi-
cial comments on April 23, 1928, at the annual meeting of the American Society of
International Law. Address of the Honorable Frank B. Kellogg, 1928 PRoc. Am. Soc'Y ITr'L
L. 141, 143. Other contemporaries analyzed the Pact in this context. See generally FER-
RELL, supra note 47, at 170-191; MILLER, supra note 136, at 83-85, 102, 104, 106, 109,
114, 123, 280; Edwin M. Borchard, The Multilateral Treaty for the Renunciation of War,
23 Am. J. INr'L L. 116 (1929); Henry M. Stimson, The Pact of Paris: Three Years of Devel-
opment, 11 FOREIGN Art. i, v (Special Supp. Oct. 1932). The international academic
community as well as the diplomats clearly understood the Pact and the self-defense
reservation. See also Louis B. Sohn, The International Court of Justice and the Scope of the
Right of Self-Defense and the Duty of Non-Intervention, in INTERNATIONAL LAw AT A TIME OF
PERPLEXITY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SHABTAI ROsENNE 869, 872-75 (Yoram Dinstein ed.,
1988).
146. FER LLi, supra note 47, at 193-200; 3 INTERNATIONAL LAw CmEFLY AS INTERPRETED
BY THE UNITED STATES 1683 (Charles Cheney Hyde ed., 1945); McDOUGAL & FELIcIANO,
supra note 1, at 141; MILLER, supra note 136, at 110-11; 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 1,
§§ 52fh, 52g; see also AExmANDROV, supra note 1, at 58. But see Quincy Wright, The
Interpretation of Multilateral Treaties, 23 Am. J. INT'L L. 94, 104, 106 (1929); Quincy
Wright, The Meaning of the Pact of Paris, 27 Am. J. INT'L L. 39, 43 (1933). The notes
debate continued in the U.S. Senate. FERRELL, supra note 47, at 300-10.
147. Note of U.K. Ambassador Houghton to Secretary of State Kellogg, May 19, 1928,
1928(1) FoR. REs. U.S. 66, 68 (1942).
148. See ALEXANDROV, supra note 1, at 55-56; FERRELL, supra note 47, at 179-81;
MILLER, supra note 136, at 68-69, 117-18, 121-22; WALTERS, supra note 99, at 385-86;
Borchard, supra note 145, at 118.
149. Note of Soviet Acting Commissar for Foreign Affairs Maxim Litvinov to French
Ambassador to Russia Herbette, Aug. 31, 1928, 1928(1) FOR. RaLs. U.S. 170, 174 (1942).
Four or five other countries objected to inclusion of any reservations, such as either the
British or the U.S. reservations. See, e.g., Note of Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs
H. Afifi to U.S. Charge' d'Affaires Winship, Sept. 3, 1928, FOR. Rats. U.S. 183, 184; Note
of Turkey's Minister for Foreign Affairs to U.S. Ambassador Joseph C. Grew, Sept. 6,
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nies, self-governing Dominions, India, and the Irish Free State, 150 the note
may have reserved a right of self-defense for Britain to defend units of the
Commonwealth and the Empire. Covenant provisions allowing League
membership for colonies and Dominions' 5 ' underscored a potential for
collective self-defense based on these relationships.
The U.S. note, to which states had responded in general agreement,
spoke of the "inherent" and "inalienable" right of self-defense.' 5 2 That this
continued the prior law, which included rights of anticipatory self-defense
and collective self-defense, was apparent from treaties, state practice, and
judicial decisions between 1928 and World War II.
The Little Entente of Balkan states, following the bilateral self-defense
treaties in 1921,15 3 negotiated its Pact of Organization in 1930.154 The
Entente declared that its governing Council's common policy was inspired
by, inter alia, the Covenant, the Pact of Paris, and the Locarno Treaties; the
1921 treaties were renewed indefinitely.' 5 5 Since the Pact incorporated the
Pact of Paris with its widely accepted self-defense reservation, the presump-
tion is that the Entente accepted the concept in its self-defense considera-
tions. That the Entente may have contemplated anticipatory self-defense
among its response options is further evidenced by its agreement with
other countries in the region, which pledged reaction to "aggression,"156
without defining this term. 157 Whether aggression meant more, such as
1928, FOR. RETs. U.S. 195, 196. BROWNLIE, USE OF FORCE, supra note 1, at 244, says
Afghanistan and Persia raised similar objections. MILLER, supra note 136, at 122, n.1
also mentions Hungary. Objections to reservations today would apply only to states
raising them and the reserving state. Vienna Convention, supra note 100, arts, 19-23,
1155 U.N.T.S. at 337-38; Reservations to Convention on Prevention & Punishment of
Crime of Genocide, 1951 I.Cj. 15 [hereinafter Genocide Reservations Case]; IAN BROWN-
LIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 608-11 (4th ed. 1990); T.O. ELIAS, THE
MODERN LAw OF TREATIES 27-36 (1974); LORD McNiaR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 158-71 (2d
ed. 1961); 1 OPPENHEIM'S INT'L L., supra note 1, §§ 614-19; RESTATEMENT (THIlD), supra
note 62, § 313; SINCLAIR, supra note 100, at 13, 51-82 (Vienna Convention, supra note
100, arts. 19-23, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 337-38, represent progressive development); D.W.
Bowett, Reservations to Non-Restricted Multilateral Treaties, 48 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 67, 88-
90 (1976); J.M. Ruda, Reservations to Treaties, 146 R.C.A.D.I. 95 (1975).
150. See generallyJ.E.S. FAwcErr, THE BRITISH COMMONWVEALTH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1963); States: British Commonwealth, 1 Whiteman DIGEST § 30.
151. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
152. U.S. Note of April 23, 1928, 1928(1) FOR. RE~s. U.S. 34, 36-37 (1942). See also
supra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
154. Pact of Organisation of the Little Entente, Feb. 16, 1933, 139 L.N.T.S. 233.
155. Id. arts. 10-11, 139 at 239 (citing inter alia LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT);
Locarno Treaty, supra note 126; Pact of Paris, supra note 11; Alliance, Apr. 23, 1921,
Czech-Rom., supra note 127; Alliance, June 7, 1921, Rom.-Yugo., supra note 127; Alli-
ance, Aug. 31, 1922, Czech.-Yugo., reprinted in NORMAN J. PADELFORD, PEACE IN THE
BALKANS 183 (1935).
156. Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, Feb. 9, 1934, 153 L.N.T.S. 153, 157; Protocol, Feb.
9, 1934, arts. 1, 3, 153 L.N.T.S. 157.
157. See GRENviLLE, supra note 125, at 115; supra notes 125-26 and accompanying
text (noting that the original 1921 agreements pledged joint reaction to "unprovoked
attack"). See also GESHKOFF, supra note 127, chs. 5-12; PADELFORD, PEACE, supra note
155, chs. 1-4 for history of negotiations.
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action short of attack, is not dear. However, the fact that it cited the Pact of
Paris indicates that the Entente accepted anticipatory self-defense as a
response option if it was part of that inherent right.
Although not formed specifically for the purpose, the Pan American
Union 58 was in place in 1936 when the Western Hemisphere states,
including the United States, negotiated agreements to "supplement and
reinforce" League efforts to prevent war. 159 The Union's members, besides
reaffirming prior treaty obligations to settle international controversies
between them by peaceful means, also agreed, subject to member obliga-
tions under the Covenant, to consult when there was a threat of war among
them. The obligations arising under the Pact of Paris were among those
confirmed. 160 While these treaties, which are still in force,161 do not cover
a Union country's war with a state outside the Americas, in reaffirming the
Pact of Paris and its self-defense reservation, 162 they reinforce that law.
The 1937 Nyon Arrangement and the Supplemental Agreement 163
declared that parties would defend merchant shipping and civil aircraft of
any state attacked by surface ships, aircraft, or submarines in parts of the
Mediterranean Sea. 164 The Arrangement announced that a submarine
attacking vessels contrary to the 1930 London Naval Armaments Treaty
and its 1936 Protocol1 65 would be attacked and possibly destroyed. It also
said that parties' forces would attack
any submarine encountered in the vicinity of a position where a ship not
belonging to either... conflicting Spanish parties [in the Spanish civil war]
hald] recently been attacked in violation of the rules... in circumstances
158. Pan American Union, Apr. 14, 1890,Jan 29, 1902, Aug. 11, 1910, 1 BEVANs 129,
344, 752. See also infra note 257 and accompanying text.
159. Convention for Maintenance, Preservation and Reestablishment of Peace, Dec.
23, 1936, preamble, 51 Stat. 15 [hereinafter Peace Convention]. See also Additional Pro-
tocol Relative to Non-intervention, Dec. 23, 1936, 51 Stat. 41.
160. Convention to Coordinate, Extend and Assure Fulfillment of Existing Treaties
Between American States, Dec. 23, 1936, arts.i-7, 51 Stat. 116, 119-21 (citing Treaty to
Avoid and Prevent Conflicts Between the American States, May 23, 1923, 44 Stat. 2527
(Gondra Treaty)); Pact of Paris, supra note 11; General Convention of Inter-American
Conciliation, Jan. 5, 1929, 46 Stat. 2209; General Treaty of Inter-American Arbitration,
Jan. 5, 1929, 49 Stat. 3153; Treaty of Non-Aggression and Conciliation, Oct. 10, 1933,
49 Stat. 3363 (Saavedra Lamas Treaty); Peace Convention, supra note 159. The Peace
Convention also referred to the Pact of Paris, supra note 11.
161. TIF, supra note 138, at 414-15, 430-31.
162. See supra notes 143-52 and accompanying text.
163. Nyon Arrangement, supra note 74; Agreement Supplementary to the Nyon
Arrangement, supra note 74. See also C. JOHN COLoMBOs, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF aHE
SEA § 472 (6th ed. 1967); NoRMAN J. PADELFoRD, INTERNATIONAl. LAw AND DIPLOMACY IN
THE SPANISH CIVIL STRIFE ch. 2 (1939); L.F.E. Goldie, Commentary, in NATALINO RONZITn,
THE LAw OF NAVAL WARFARE: A COLLECnON OF AGREEMENTs ANm DOcUMENTs wrrH COM-
MENTARIEs 489 (1988).
164. See generally PADE.FoRD, INTERNAIONAL, supra note 163, ch. 2, App. XV; WAL-
TERs, supra note 99, at 721, 725-26 for descriptions of attacks.
165. Treaty for Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armaments, Apr. 22, 1930, art. 22,
46 Stat. 2858, 2881-82, 112 L.N.T.S. 65, 88; Proces-Verbal Relating to Rules of Subma-
rine Warfare Set Forth in Part IV of the Treaty of London of 22 April 1930, Nov. 6, 1936,
173 L.N.T.S. 353, 355-57. See also Edwin I. Nwogugu, Commentary, in RONz-r, supra
note 163, at 353.
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which give valid grounds for the belief that the submarine was guilty of the
attack. 166
Because of further submarine attacks on merchantmen, Nyon parties
announced they would sink "any submarine found submerged" in Mediter-
ranean Sea zones under their control.1 67
The Arrangement as published and applied is an example of maritime
anticipatory collective self-defense. 16 8 Nine states, several with no Medi-
terranean coastlines, agreed to protect shipping and aircraft. These states
declared they would attack a submerged submarine near an attacked mer-
chantman and later broadened the Arrangement coverage to include sub-
marines found submerged in their patrol areas. In today's terminology, it
would be said that a submarine's presence in the area is perceived as a
manifestation of hostile intent, and the submarine is subject to a preemp-
tive attack to eliminate it as a threat to merchant shipping. When states
cooperated under the Arrangement to suppress submarine attacks, they
acted in anticipatory collective self-defense.
In 1934, the International Law Association adopted the Budapest Arti-
cles of Interpretation of the Pact of Paris, which recited the following
principles:
(2) A signatory State which threatens to resort to armed force for the solu-
tion of an international dispute or conflict is guilty of a violation of the
Pact.
(3) A signatory State which aids a violating State thereby itself violates the
Pact.
(4) In the event of a violation of the Pact by a resort to armed force or war by
one signatory State against another, the other States may, without
thereby committing a breach of the Pact or any rule of International
Law, do all or any of the following things:
(a) Refuse to admit the exercise by the State violating the Pact of bellig-
erent rights, such as visit and search, blockade, etc.;
(b) Decline to observe towards the State violating the Pact the duties
prescribed by International Law, apart from the Pact, for a neutral
in relation to a belligerent;
(c) Supply the State attacked with financial or material assistance,
including munitions of war;
(d) Assist with armed forces the State attacked. 16 9
Although some states and commentators noted that after approval no state
adopted the articles as policy, it has been argued that the articles and the
1939 Harvard Draft Convention on Rights and Duties of States in Case of
Aggression 170 legitimized 1939-41 U.S. aid to the Allies in World War II
166. Nyon Arrangement, supra note 74, 1I 2-3, 181 L.N.T.S. at 137.
167. Goldie, supra note 163, at 494.
168. PADELFORD, INTERNATIONAL, supra note 163, at 49.
169. International Law Association, Budapest Articles of Interpretation: Final Text,
arts. 2-4, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AssoCIATION, REPORT OF THE 38Tm CONFERENCE 66-67
(1934), reprinted in Rights and Duties of States in Case of Aggression, 33 Am. J. IrTrr'L L.
819, 825-26 n.1 (Supp.- 1939) [hereinafter Budapest Articles].
170. Harvard Draft Convention on Rights and Duties of States in Case of Aggression,
33 AM. J. INT'L L. 819, 819-43 (Supp. 1939). BowErT, supra note 1, at 161, writing in
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before the United States entered the conflict.1 71
Article 4(c) seemed to permit American aid to victims of German and
Italian aggression.1 72 If article 4(c) supplied legal backbone for Lend-
Lease and similar arrangements while the United States was not at war,173
article 4(d) was a basis for collective self-defense and anticipatory self-
defense in particular.1 74 Besides aiding the Allies materially, the United
States began escorting war-material convoys to the middle of the Atlantic
Ocean, turning over escort duties to the Royal Navy and other allied forces
at that point.' 75 Such convoying led to clashes between the U.S. and Ger-
man navies. The U.S.S. Niblack executed attacks when there was a subma-
rine threat, the U.S.S. Reuben James was sunk, and the U.S.S. Kearney was
damaged.' 76 Although no text of the U.K.-U.S. arrangement has been pub-
lished (perhaps because it was an oral agreement or due to national secur-
ity considerations), undoubtedly there was some sort of arrangement
between the two countries.1 77 States do not send their navies into harm's
way without agreeing on terms. If article 4(d) restated customary and gen-
eral principles norms, it was proper for U.S. warships not only to respond
to submarine attacks on them but also to anticipate attacks with appropri-
ate force measures. Thus the United States could have invoked the princi-
ple stated in article 4(d) to assert a right of anticipatory self-defense
against German submarine attacks. Since the United Kingdom and the
United States had an informal arrangement, this would have been anticipa-
tory collective self-defense.
C. Other Treaties Concluded Before and During World War II
Defense treaties signed before and during World War II support the con-
cept of anticipatory collective self-defense. Because the League of Nations
and its treaty registration and publication system collapsed,178 the record
1958, said the Draft Convention's principles were de legeferenda. Query whether he
would have come to the same conclusion after the relatively full historical record of
World War II had been available.
171. George K. Walker, Maritime Neutrality in the Charter Era, 17 ANN. PROC. U. VA.
CENTER FOR OcEANs L. & POL. 124, 142-46 (1993). See also ROBERT E. SHERWOOD,
ROOSEVELT AND HOPINS: AN INTIMATE HISTORY chs. 10, 12 (1950 rev. ed.) for a U.S. and
diplomatic history perspective on Lend-Lease.
172. Budapest Articles, supra note 169, art. 4(c).
173. Id.
174. Id. art. 4(d).
175. 1 SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, HISTORY OF UNITED STATES NAvAL OPERATIONS DURING
WORLD WAR II: THE BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIc: SEPTEMBER 1939-MAY 1943, at 56-113
(1947). President Franklin D. Roosevelt chose the line on July 11, 1941, by ripping a
map out of a National Geographic Magazine and drawing a line for the U.S. Navy's polic-
ing area, which included seas east of Greenland and Iceland. SHERWOOD, supra note
171, at 308, 310-11. Executive agreements for protecting Greenland and Iceland had
already been signed. See infra notes 194, 198-99 and accompanying text.
176. See MORISON, supra note 175, at 56-113.
177. See generally SHERWOOD, supra note 171, at 308, 310-11, which recounts details
of the U.K.-U.S. arrangement, which was probably informal in nature. See also RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD), supra note 62, § 301 cmt. b & r.n. 4, § 312 r.n. 5.
178. See WALTERS, supra note 99, chs. 66-67.
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of international agreements during 1935-45 is not complete. What is avail-
able supports a view that states believed treaties could provide for anticipa-
tory collective self-defense.
The USSR's pacts with France and Czechoslovakia (1935) pledged
mutual assistance if either party was subjected to "unprovoked aggression"
and consultation if threatened with aggression.1 79 The 1936 treaty with
Mongolia followed the same pattern.18 0 When war clouds loomed for the
USSR in 1939 and the war had begun for other countries, Soviet treaties
with Estonia and Latvia pledged that each would come to the other's assist-
ance if there was "direct aggression or threat of aggression" (Estonia), t 8 1 or
"direct attack or threat of attack" (Latvia). i8 2
British and French eleventh-hour bilateral mutual assistance treaties
with Poland provided for reactive self-defense. Further, they pledged sup-
port and assistance if a European Power "clearly threatened," by "any
action," "directy or indirectly," a party's independence, and that party
"considered it vital to resist [such action] with its armed forces." 183
After France and Britain entered the war, they pledged aid to Turkey if
it were involved in hostilities with a European power, or if an act of aggres-
sion were committed against it. 18 4 Turkey agreed to observe "at least a
benevolent neutrality" if Britain or France were engaged in hostilities with
a European power and would aid them if they became involved in hostili-
ties because of guarantees given to Greece or Romania. 185 The parties also
pledged mutual consultation. 186
The twenty-year USSR-U.K. alliance (1942) pledged collective self-
defense after the war if these states again became involved in hostilities
179. Treaty of Mutual Assistance, May 2, 1935, Fr.-USSR, arts. 1-2, 167 L.N.T.S. 395,
404; Treaty of Mutual Assistance, May 16, 1935, Czech.-USSR, arts. 1-2, 159 L.N.T.S.
347, 357. See also KAGAN, supra note 22, at 390.
180. Protocol of Mutual Assistance, May 2, 1935, Mong.-USSR, arts. 1-2, 140 Brit. &
For. St. Pap. 666.
181. Pact of Mutual Assistance, Sept. 28, 1939, Est.-USSR, art. 1, 198 U.N.T.S. 223,
228.
182. Pact of Mutual Assistance, Oct. 5, 1939, Lat.-USSR, art. 1, 198 U.N.T.S. 381, 386.
The USSR also negotiated a pact with Lithuania on Oct. 10, 1939. These agreements'
real purpose was in other provisions, granting the USSR bases in these states.
GRENVILLE, supra note 125, at 182-83, 201.
183. Agreement of Mutual Assistance, Aug. 25, 1939, Pol.-U.K., art. 2, 199 L.N.T.S.
57, 58. A Secret Protocol, Aug. 25, 1939, Pol.-U.K., arts. 1-2, reprinted in GRENVILLE,
supra note 125, at 191, defined the Agreement's object as defense against Germany,
included the Free City of Danzig within the meaning of contracting parties, and would
include Belgium, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Netherlands once mutual assistance
pacts with those states had been concluded. Protocol of Mutual Assistance, Sept. 4,
1939, Fr.-Pol., art. 1, reprinted in GRENVILLE, supra note 125, at 192, employed language
similar to the Poland-U.K. agreement but did not append a secret protocol, insofar as
research reveals. See also 1 WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, THE SECOND WORLD WAR 397 (1948);
GRENVILLE, supra note 125, at 178-79; WALTERS, supra note 99, at 798-99.
184. Treaty of Mutual Assistance, Oct. 15, 1939, Fr.-Turk.-U.K., 200 L.N.T.S. 167. See
also 1 CHURCHILL, supra note 183, at 551, 703 (explaining Turkey's fear of a Soviet
attack); GRENVILLE, supra note 125, at 179-80.
185. Treaty of Mutual Assistance, supra note 184, art. 4, at 171.
186. Id. arts. 1-7, at 169-71.
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with Germany or states associated with it.18 7 France's alliance with the
USSR had similar terms. 188 A USSR-U.K. alliance with Iran pledged to
defend Iran from "all aggression on the part of Germany,"189 presump-
tively contemplating only reactive self-defense.
In the Western Hemisphere, the 1939 Declaration of Panama, 190 nego-
tiated while the American states were not at war, asserted that:
As a measure of continental self-protection, the American Republics, so long
as they maintain their neutrality, are as of inherent right entitled to have
those waters adjacent to the American continent, which they regard as of
primary concern and direct utility in their relations, free from the commis-
sion of any hostile act by any non-American belligerent ... ,whether such
hostile act be attempted or made from land, sea or air. 191
The Declaration applied these standards to a 300-mile zone off the Ameri-
can coasts. 192 Although the zone may have been unlawful because it was
not proportional in terms of territorial scope, 19 3 the important point for
this analysis is that the Declaration asserted a collective claim to freedom
from effects of "attempted" hostile acts. To that extent, the Declaration
implicitly declared a right of anticipatory collective self-defense.
A 1941 Denmark-U.S. agreement for defending Greenland could also
be said to be anticipatory in nature. 194 This treaty reaffirmed the existence
187. Treaty of Alliance in War Against Hitlerite Germany and Her Associates in
Europe and of Collaboration and Mutual Assistance Thereafter, May 26, 1942, U.K.-
USSR, arts. 3-4, 204 L.N.T.S. 353, 356. See also Agreement Providing forJoint Action in
War Against Germany, July 12, 1941, U.K.-USSR, 204 L.N.T.S. 277; 4 CHURCHILL, supra
note 183, at 335-36 (1950); GRENVILLE, supra note 125, at 204-06.
188. Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance, Dec. 10, 1944, Fr.-USSR, arts. 1, 3-4,
149 Brit. & For. St. Pap. 632, 633-34. See also Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assist-
ance and Post-War Cooperation, Dec. 12, 1943, Czech-USSR, art. 3, 145 Brit. & For. St.
Pap. 238, 239. This treaty can only be interpreted as applying to reactive measures,
since it spoke of a party's involvement in a future war with Germany. Treaty of Friend-
ship and Alliance, China-USSR, art. 3, reprinted in GRENVILLE, supra note 125, at 237,
had similar terms for future war with Japan. See also GRENviLLE, supra note 125, at 226.
The Agreement, July 30, 1941, Pol.-USSR, art. 3, 144 Brit. & For. St. Pap. 869, could only
be regarded as a defensive alliance, since both states were then at war with Germany.
See GRENViLLE, supra note 125, at 207, 209.
189. Treaty of Alliance, Jan. 29, 1942, art. 3(i), 36 AM. J. INr'L L. 175, 176 (Supp.
1942), 144 Brit. & For. St. Pap. 1017, 1018. See also GRENW TL, supra note 125, at 204.
190. Declaration of Panama, supra note 13.
191. Id. c 1, 3 BEVANS at 609.
192. Id.
193. Belligerents refused to recognize the zone. Panama Minister for Foreign Affairs
Narciso Garay cable to U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Jan. 26, 1940, enclosing
Statement on Behalf of the British Government, Statement on Behalf of the French Gov-
ernment, 1940(1) FOR. RE~s. U.S. 689, 690, 693 (1959); Panama Ambassador Jorge E.
Boyd cable to Secretary of State Hull, Feb. 16, 1940, enclosing note of German Charge
d'Affaires Von Winter to Panama Minister for Foreign Affairs Garay, Feb. 14, 1940,
1940(1) FOR. REas. U.S. 696. Situation III: Contiguous Zones, Airplanes, and Neutrality,
in NAvAL WAR COLLEGE, INTERNATIONAL LAW SITUATIONS 1939, at 59, 80 (1940) con-
cluded that the Declaration was not a part of international law. See also GRENVILLE,
supra note 125, at 246-47; ROBERT W. TucKER, THE LAw OF WAR AND NEuTRALrTY AT SEA
224-26 (Nav. War C. Int'l L. Stud., v. 50, 1957).
194. When the agreement was signed, the United States was not at war, although
Germany had overrun Denmark Agreement Relating to Defense of Greenland, Apr. 7-9,
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of a perceived threat to the Western Hemisphere as acknowledged in the
1940 Act of Havana, which was "considered, in effect, an act of self-defense
by the American republics."' 9 5 The Act created an emergency committee,
pending ratification of a convention, empowered to act to assume govern-
ance of a belligerent's Western Hemisphere colony or possession that was
"attacked" or "threatened." If "the need for emergency action [was] so
urgent that action by the committee [could] not be awaited," an American
republic, unilaterally or jointly, "[had] the right to act in the manner which
its own defense or that of the continent require[d]." 19 6 This broad lan-
guage recognized and left open a potential for anticipatory collective self-
defense responses, particularly in view of authority given to make "urgent"
responses to "threat[s]."' 9 7
A similar U.S. agreement to defend Iceland in 1941 did not refer to the
Act of Havana.' 98 However, the president's response in this executive
agreement to the effect that Iceland's defense was necessary to forestall a
menace to Western Hemisphere security' 9 9 might be construed as collec-
tive self-defense, anticipatory in nature. U.S. defense of Iceland would fore-
stall menaces to American republics subject to the Act of Havana.
D. The Potential for Anticipatory Collective Self-Defense
When the Covenant, the Locarno Treaty, and the Pact of Paris as inter-
preted by the Budapest Articles are considered together, there is a strong
argument for the view that they articulated the potential for anticipatory
collective defense, albeit without precision. The Nyon Arrangement, and
practice under it, was a clear example of anticipatory collective self-defense
in action.20 0 The thrust of the Declaration of Panama and some interna-
tional agreements before and during World War II were to the same effect.
To be sure, the notion of self-preservation as equated with self-defense may
1941, Den.-U.S., art. 1, 55 Stat. 1245, 1246, 204 L.N.T.S. 135, 137, terminated by Agree-
ment, Apr. 27, 1951, Den.-U.S., 2 U.S.T. 1485. See also Agreement Relating to Defense of
Greenland, NAVAL WA COLLEGE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DOcUMENTS 1940, at 202-13
(1942); supra note 169 and accompanying text.
195. Rights and Duties of States, 5 Whiteman DIGEST § 25, at 997, referring to Act of
Havana, July 30, 1940, 54 Stat. 2491, cited in Agreement Relating to Defense of Green-
land, supra note 194, art. 1, 55 Stat. at 1246, 204 L.N.T.S. at 127. See also GRENVILLE,
supra note 125, at 247.
196. Act of Havana, supra note 195, 54 Stat. at 2502, 2504, referring to Convention
Respecting Provisional Administration of European Colonies and Possessions in the
Americas, July 30, 1940, 56 Stat. 1273. The Convention, a permanent treaty, partially
superseded the Act, which was an executive agreement in U.S. practice but a treaty for
other states; the Convention did not assert the self-defense rights stated in the Act.
Nonetheless, it must be presumed that these provisions remained in effect, for they were
cited by Agreement Relating to Defense of Greenland, supra note 194, art. 1, 55 Stat. at
1246. See supra notes 194-95 and accompanying text.
197. Act of Havana, supra note 195, 54 Stat. at 2502.
198. Agreement Relating to Defense of Greenland, supra note 194.
199. Agreement Respecting Defense of Iceland by United States Forces, July 1, 1941,
55 Stat. 1547, 1549-50, terminated by Exchange of Notes, Oct. 7, 1946, 61 Stat. 2426.
See also Defense of Iceland by United States Forces, in NAvAL WAR COLLEGE, INTERNATIONAL
LAw DocuMENTs 1940, at 245-50 (1942); supra note 195 and accompanying text.
200. Nyon Arrangement, supra note 74, 181 L.N.T.S. 135.
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have been discounted by then,20 1 but an anticipatory collective self-defense
claim remained admissible.
I1. Drafting the Charter and Winding Up World War II
Research and drafting for a new international organization to replace the
League of Nations began during World War 11.202 The U.N. Charter was
signed during the last year of that war, with original Members' ratifications
often coming after hostilities ended. Agreements to prosecute war
criminals were also signed during the war (for example, the Nuremberg
Charter, in 1945),203 but judgments came down years later. The U.N.'s
beginnings are therefore necessarily intertwined with the end of the war
and the war crimes trials.
Section A of this Part analyzes the drafting of the Charter as it relates
to collective self-defense. Section B discusses the trials of the major war
criminals as those proceedings relate to the issues of self-defense and antic-
ipatory self-defense.
A. The Charter Drafting Process and Collective Self-Defense
The draft emerging from discussions and preparations for the San Fran-
cisco Charter conference did not provide for self-defense, then considered
inherent in nature.20 4 The Act of Chapultepec, signed a month before the
conference, provided for pledges of collective measures, including use of
force, to meet threats or acts of aggression against a Western Hemisphere
country. 205 Like the interwar agreements and practice, 206 the Act in effect
declared a right to anticipatory collective self-defense.
To address the concerns of some Latin American states, the San Fran-
cisco conference included article 51 in the Charter.20 7 Although some
argue that the Charter confers a new right of collective self-defense in arti-
201. McHugh, supra note 1, at 65.
202. See generally GoODRICH Er AL., supra note 5, at 1-12; RuTH B. RUSSELL, A HISTORY
OF THE UNITED NAIONS CHARTER (1958); SIMmA, supra note 1, at 2-12.
203. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 140. See also supra notes 140-41, and infra notes
238-43 and accompanying text.
204. See generally ALExANDROV, supra note 1, at 77-79; GOODRICH Er AL., supra note 5,
at 44, 342-43; McCoaMacK, supra note 1, at 153-57, 167-68; RUSSELL, supra note 202, at
456, 688-712.
205. Inter-American Reciprocal Assistance and Solidarity, Mar. 8, 1945, Parts 1(3),
1(4), I-IIl, 60 Stat. 1831, 1839-40 [hereinafter Act of Chapultepec]. See also Manuel S.
Canyes, The Inter-American System and the Conference of Chapultepec, 39 AM. J. INrr'L L.
504 (1945); Josef L. Kunz, The Inter-American System and the United Nations Organiza-
tion, 39 AM. J. Irr'L L. 758 (1945). The Act was superseded by Inter-American Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance, Sept. 2, 1947, 62 Stat. 1681, 21 U.N.T.S. 77 [hereinafter Rio
Treaty], and the end of World War II. See also infra notes 255-62 and accompanying
text.
206. See supra notes 190-96 and accompanying text.
207. See generally ALEXANDROV, supra note 1, at 80-93; BowErr, supra note 1, at 182-
83; BROWNLE, USE OF FORCE, supra note 1, at 270-71; GOODRICH Er AL.., supra note 5, at
342-44; RUSSELL, supra note 202, at 690-99; STomEzER, supra note 18, at 28; Kunz, Inter-
American System, supra note 205.
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cle 51,208 states had been practicing collective self-defense, or at least had
stated such a right, in treaties long before the Charter was ratified. A
related problem is whether there is a variant of self-defense apart from the
standards of article 51. Most scholars say that there is no other inherent
right apart from that stated by and developed under article 51.209 How-
ever, the Nicaragua Case, which held that a parallel customary norm bound
the litigants when the Charter could not be applied,210 may open a door to
developing principles opposing Charter norms 211 and possibly outweigh-
ing Charter principles.212
Exercising a right of collective self-defense need not be pursuant to a
multilateral arrangement; a country may assist another under a bilateral
treaty or without any previous treaty or other arrangement. The travaux
preparatoires for the Charter support this view:
[I]t is true that it was for purposes of fitting regional arrangements, and
particularly the inter-American System, into the general international organi-
zation that article 51 was added at San Francisco. However, the discussions
208. See ALExANDROV, supra note 1, at 95; 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, § 52aa, at 155;
Robert W. Tucker, The Interpretation of War Under Present International Law, 4 Irr'L
L.Q. 11, 29 (1951).
209. J.B. BRIERuv, THE LAw OF NATIONS 417 (Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963);
BROWNLIE, USE OF FORCE, supra note 1, at 271-72; GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 5, at 344;
JEssuP, supra note 1, at 166-68; HANS KELSEN, RECENT TRENDS IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED
NATIONS 913-14 (1961); D.W. Bowett, Collective Self-Defense under the Charter of the
United Nations, 32 BRIT. Y.B. Ir'L L. 130, 131 (1955); Arthur L. Goodhart, The North
Atlantic Treaty of 1949, 79 R.C.A.D.I. 187, 192 (1951).
210. Nicaragua Case, 1986 I.CJ. 4, 94 (June 27). See also id. at 152-53 (sep. opin. of
Singh, Pres.); Sohn, supra note 145, at 871.
211. These include, for example, self-defense principles to justify anti-terrorism and
drug trafficking suppression. Geoffrey M. Levitt, Intervention to Combat Terrorism and
Drug Trafficking, in LAw AND FORCE, supra note 1, at 224. Kolosov, supra note 1, at 234,
proposed a treaty to define self-defense.
212. Cf. I.CJ. STATUTE, art. 38(1); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 62, §§ 102-03,
emphasize that treaty law, for example, the Charter, must be balanced against custom-
ary norms, and that custom can develop contrary to treaty-based law and can outweigh
treaty law. U.N. CHARm art. 103 only applies to treaties inconsistent with the Charter.
Moreover, jus cogens norms may outweigh custom or treaties. If ajus cogens norm devel-
ops on a track different from a Charter-based norm or a customary norm based on the
Charter, jus cogens trumps either. On the other hand, if a Charter-based norm, whether
a rule from the Charter as treaty or a parallel customary rule, is jus cogens, it trumps
other standards. Nicaragua Case, 1986 L.CJ. at 100, held norms under U.N. CHARTER
art. 2(4) approached jus cogens status, superseding contrary custom. At least one com-
mentator has argued that the right to self-defense as a jus cogens norm may be pre-
sumed. Carin Kahgan, Jus Cogens and the Inherent Right to Self-Defense, 3 ILSAJ. INT'L
& COMP. L. 767, 827 (1997). The scope ofjus cogens norms varies widely among com-
mentators. See also Vienna Convention, supra note 100, arts. 5, 30(1), 53, 64, 1155
U.N.T.S. at 339, 344, 347; ELIAS, supra note 149, at 177-87; 1 OPPENHEIM'S INT'L L., supra
note 1, §§ 2, at 642, 653; SINCLAIR, supra note 100, at 17-18, 85-87, 94-95, 160, 184-85,
218-26, 246; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 62, §§ 102 r.n.6, 323 cmt. b, 331(2),
338(2); GRIGORII I. TUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 98 (William E. Butler trans.,
1974); Levan Alexidze, Legal Nature ofJus Cogens in Contemporary Law, 172 R.C.A.D.I.
219, 262-63 (1981); Jimenez de Arechaga, supra note 117, at 64-69; John N. Hazard,
Soviet Tactics in International Lawmaking, 7 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 9, 25-29 (1977);
Mark Weisburd, The Emptiness of the Concept ofJus Cogens, As Illustrated by the War in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, 17 MICH.J. INT'L L. 1 (1995); supra note 137 and accompanying text.
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at San Francisco not only by members of regional arrangements in the
proper sense of that term, but also by parties to bilateral treaties governing
their joint security, as well as assistance by one State to another without any
treaty obligation. Article 51 was deliberately transferred... from Chapter
VIII to Chapter VII with the result that the right of collective self-defense had
become "entirely independent of the existence of a regional
arrangement."2 13
Collective self-defense does not depend on "the degree of organization or of
treaty relationship" of states.214 The term "collective" covers more than
contractual systems of self-defense.2 15 As one scholar notes, "[a]ny Mem-
ber... is therefore authorized by the Charter to assist with its armed force
an attacked State, whether or not there has been any previous arrangement
to that effect."2 16
Although it has been argued that an assisting state must have substan-
tive rights or interests affected by an attacking state's action, 217 or that an
assisting state must have an individual right of self-defense, 2 18 neither is a
legal prerequisite for coming to the aid of a target state. Any assisting state
may act out of general interest in preserving international peace and secur-
ity, and can do so without a formal treaty as long as the target state con-
sents.2 19 A state assisting a target state need not be subjected to armed
attack to invoke the right of self-defense for itself.2 20 However,
213. ALEXANDROV, supra note 1, at 101-02, quoting Waldock, Regulation, supra note 1,
at 504 (referring to U.N. CHARTER arts. 39-51 (Chapter VII, Action with Respect to
Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression), 52-54 (Chapter VIII,
Regional Arrangements)).
214. ALExANDROV, supra note 1, at 102 (citing BowEr-r, supra note 1, at 131).
215. Id. at 102 (citing GOODRICH Er AL., supra note 5, at 179; Waldock, Regulation,
supra note 1, at 504).
216. ALExANDROV, supra note 1, at 102 (citing GOODRICH Er AL., supra note 5, at 179;
KELsEN, LAv OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 4, at 796; Waldock, Regulation, supra
note 1, at 504).
217. OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, § 52aa, at 155-56; Bowett, Collective Self-Defence, supra
note 209, at 136-40, 159-60.
218. BowErr, supra note 1, at 216-20; JuLIus STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL CONFLICT 245 (1959 rev.); Bowett, Collective Self-Defence, supra note 209, at 139-
40.
219. ALEXANDROV, supra note 1, at 102 (citing GOODRICH Er AL., supra note 5, at 348;
KELSEN, LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 4, at 792; McDoUGAL & FEUCIANO,
supra note 1, at 250). Starke states that the Security Treaty memorialized informal
arrangements after World War II and during the Korean War. See J.G. STAEKE, THE
ANZUS TREATY ALLIANCE 98-99 (1965) (discussing Security Treaty, Sept. 1, 1951, pream-
ble, 3 U.S.T. 3420, 3422, 131 U.N.T.S. 83, 84 [hereinafter ANZUS Pact]). See also
TREVOR R. REESE, AUsTRALA, NEw ZEALAND AND THE UNITED STATES: A SURVEY OF INTERrA-
TIONAL RELATIONS chs. 2, 4 (1969); W. DAVID McINTnYE, BACKGROUND TO THE ANZUS
PACT, chs. 9-10 (1995); infra notes 23943 and accompanying text. A theory of informal
collective self-defense arrangements also supports, for example, actions of states assist-
ing South Korea or maintaining naval forces between Taiwan and the China mainland
during the Korean War. See generally George K. Walker, State Practice Since World War
11: 1945-1990, in RICHARDJ. GRUNAWALT, THE LAw OF NAVAL WARFARE: TARGETING ENEMY
MERCHANT SHIPPING 121, 125-30 (Nay. War C. Int'l L. Stud., v. 65, 1993).
220. ALEXANDROV, supra note 1, at 103; GOODRICH Er AL., supra note 5, at 348.
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collective self-defense has in any event always to be based ultimately upon
the right of an individual State to take action in self-defense .... If ... not
linked by a previous arrangement with the attacked State such as, through a
bilateral or multilateral treaty, [assisting states] have the right to use force to
provide assistance on the basis of an explicit request by the [target] state.22 1
The political truth in today's information age may point to use of treaties
instead of informal collective self-defense arrangements. Nevertheless,
such informal arrangements are lawful in the Charter era.
The foregoing analysis has not responded to the problem of states with
divergent views on the scope of self-defense. While some states espouse an
anticipatory self-defense policy, other states have a more restrictive or reac-
tive ("take the first hit") policy. 222 Further, some states may share the
same general policy (that of anticipatory self-defense) but differ as to
under what situations and circumstances the norm may apply.
2 23
Where an assisting state with an anticipatory self-defense policy
comes to the aid of a state with a restrictive view, it will be presumed that
the assisted state has either negotiated a treaty or made a request for assist-
ance. Thus, the assisting state is free, but is not obliged, to employ antici-
patory self-defense to fulfil its treaty or arrangement obligations. In the
reverse situation, where a restrictive view state assists a state with a policy
of anticipatory self-defense, the same principles should apply. The assist-
ing state may, but is not obliged, to invoke anticipatory self-defense; the
anticipatory self-defense state knew or should have known of the self-
imposed limitations on the assisting state. In either case there is no need,
as a matter of law, for the target state to request a kind or degree of assist-
ance from the assisting state. However, as a matter of policy, the target
state may request either reactive or anticipatory aid, and the assisting state
221. ALEXANDROV, supra note 1, at 103 (citing Waldock, Regulation, supra note 1, at
505). See also Louise Doswald-Beck, The Legal Validity of Military Intervention by Invita-
tion of the Government, 56 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 189, 218-21 (1985). The right to assist
another state is not an inherent right. KEasEN, LAw OF THE UNITED NATnONS, supra note 4,
at 797. This is consistent with one view of the law of treaties, which declares that treaty
parties cannot agree to confer a benefit (here, aiding a target state) without beneficiary
consent. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 62, § 324(3). Under this view, if an assisting
state and a target state are U.N. Members, the target state faces a treaty-based benefit
and must request help before the assisting state can act legally. Vienna Convention,
supra note 100, art. 36(1), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 341, is the same as the Restatement view but
adds that unless a treaty provides otherwise, assent is presumed. Under this approach
an assisting state could assume that a benefit - help against an attacking state - is
presumed under the article 51 collective self-defense. 1 OPPENHEIM'S IN'L L., supra note
1, § 627, at 1264, says the Charter is an exception to the rule that a treaty (the Charter)
cannot impose benefits on a state not party, i.e., a state that is not a U.N. Member.
However, this does not affect the article 51 request rule among U.N. Members. Requir-
ing a request is the safer course; otherwise an assisting state may be accused of violating
U.N. CHIARTER art. 2. See 1 OPPENHEIM'S IN'L L., supra, § 626; SINCLuaR, supra note 100,
at 98-106.
222. See generally supra note 1 for different views of the United States, which has an
anticipatory self-defense policy and the USSR, which held a restrictive view.
223. See, e.g., supra note 3. Commentators disagree on the legality of the 1981 Israeli
raid on the Iraq reactor. Compare, e.g., ALEXANDROV, supra note 1, at 159-65, with
McComAcK, supra note 1, at 285-302.
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should carefully consider which kind of assistance is being sought. Thus a
target state might ask for self-defense help that amounts to reactive and not
anticipatory action. In that case the assisting state must consider whether
it can, as a matter of policy, stop at that line, commensurate with its munic-
ipal governance limitations, e.g. action taken by its legislative body, or its
perceived need to assure safety of its contributed forces. In the reverse
situation, where an anticipatory self-defense state asks what amounts to
anticipatory self-defense help from a state espousing a restrictive view, the
same principles should apply.
There is a critical difference between a treaty relationship and a more
informal request or arrangement when a situation develops. Failure to
comply with a treaty term as understood by prior interpretive practice car-
ries with it the risk of denunciation,224 claims of breach,225 fundamental
change of circumstances, 226 impossibility of performance, 227 among other
risks.
The foregoing situations assume a bilateral relationship, by treaty or
otherwise. The problem is more complicated in circumstances of multilat-
eral relationships. However, if states with the same anticipatory self-
defense view aid a group of reactive view states, or if a group of reactive
224. Unless a treaty provides otherwise, it remains in effect a year after a notice of
denunciation is filed. See generally Vienna Convention, supra note 100, arts. 5658,
1155 U.N.T.S. at 345; International Law Commission, Report on the Work of its 18th
Sess., Report of the Commission to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev. 1,
reprinted in 2 1974 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM. 171, 250-51 [hereinafter ILC Rep.]; BROWNLIE,
supra note 149, at 617; McNAR, supra note 149, at 493-94; 1 OPPENHEIM'S INT'L L., supra
note 1, § 647; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 62, §§ 332-33; SINCL,4R, supra note 100,
at 183-88.
225. Claim of a material breach, without notice and other procedures, does not entitle
a claimant to say a treaty is terminated. See ILC Rep., supra note 224, at 253-55. Claims
of breach must go to the heart of an agreement. Special rules apply to multilateral trea-
ties. Vienna Convention, supra note 100, art. 60, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 346; Advisory Opin-
ion on Namibia, 1971 I.CJ. 16, 46-47;Jurisdiction of ICAO Council (India v. Pak.), 1972
I.CJ. 46, 67; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 62, § 335; BROWNLE, supra note 149, at
618-19; 1 OPPENHEIM'S INT'L L., supra note 1, § 649; SINCLAIR, supra note 100, at 20, 166,
188-90.
226. For example, a state with a strong anticipatory self-defense policy assisting a
reactive self-defense policy state insisting on reactive self-defense aid might claim that
only reactive aid would endanger its forces, configured for anticipatory self-defense, and
that this amounts to a fundamental change of circumstances because its self-defense
preparations are keyed to use in an anticipatory mode. For further analysis of funda-
mental change of circumstances, see Vienna Convention, supra note 100, art. 62, 1155
U.N.T.S at 346; Fisheries Jurisdiction (Ice. v. U.K.), 1973 L.CJ. 3, 18; BROWNLE, supra
note 149, at 620-21; ARIE E. DAVID, THE STRATEGY OF TREATY TERMINATION ch. 1 (1975);
ELIAS, supra note 149, at 119-28; ILC Rep., supra note 224, at 257-58; 1 OPPENHmM'S INT'L
L., supra note 1, § 651; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 62, § 336; SINCI.R, supra note
100, at 20, 192-96; Gyorgy Haraszti, Treaties and the Fundamental Change of Circum-
stances, 146 R.C.A.D.I. 1 (1975); OliverJ. Lissitzyn, Treaties and Changed Circumstances,
61 Am. J. INT'L L. 895 (1967).
227. For further analysis of impossibility of performance, see Vienna Convention,
supra note 100, art. 61, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 346; ELIAS, supra note 149, at 128-30; ILC Rep.,
supra note 224, at 255-56; 1 OPPENHEiM'S INT'L L., supra note 1, § 650; SINCLAIR, supra
note 100, at 190-92.
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view states aid a group of anticipatory self-defense states, the result is the
same as in the bilateral context.
The complications increase, however, when some assisting states have
anticipatory self-defense positions while others have a reactive self-defense
policy, and target states have similarly differing views. Second, suppose
that some assisting states have differing anticipatory self-defense views,228
and others have differing reactive self-defense policies, and the same is true
for target states. The same, and perhaps greater, risks of denunciations,
claims of treaty breach, fundamental change of circumstances, or impossi-
bility might be lodged.229 One solution for this problem might be the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties approach on reservations,230
which provides that anticipatory self-defense applies only as to those states
that mutually agree on principles and that otherwise the lowest common
denominator (perhaps a diminished scope for anticipatory self-defense or
only reactive self-defense) applies as between parties.231 In a multinational
military operation, analysis, like that imposed by the Vienna Convention
for multilateral treaties, could create a legal nightmare. 232 An alternative
might be an analogy to the traditional rule for treaty reservations, that all
states must concur 233 or assistance will end. Another alternative is consul-
tation in a given situation, provided for by a treaty term much like those
terms in the pre-World War I treaties, as opposed to reliance on arrange-
ments or target state requests. This appears to be the direction toward
which mutual defense treaties are headed.234
There are two more issues involved with claims of self-defense. First,
states may change policies after ratifying a treaty, perhaps moving from
reactive self-defense to an anticipatory self-defense posture. A state may
228. See, for example, supra notes 3,221 and accompanying text for differing views of
commentators on the validity of claims of anticipatory self-defense claims for specific
operations.
229. See supra notes 225-27 and accompanying text.
230. See Vienna Convention, supra note 100, arts. 19-23, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 337-38.
231. This is like the rule of regression to common denominator when states rely on
custom and there are objectors. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 62, § 102 cmts. b,
d; BROWNLIE, supra note 149, at 10; 1 OPPENHEIM'S INT'L L., supra note 1, § 10, at 29;
Michael Akehurst, Custom As a Source of Law, 47 BRIT Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 23-27 (1974);
C.H.M. Waldock, General Course on Public International Law, 106 R.C.A.D.I. 1, 49-53
(1962). But see Jonathan Charney, Universal International Law, 87 Am. J. INT'L L. 529,
538-41 (1993) (existence of persistent objector rule open to serious doubt). J. ASHLEY
ROACH & ROBERT W. SMITH, UNITED STATES RESPONSES TO EXCESSIVE MARITIME CLAIMS (2d
ed. 1996), an exhaustive study of objections to law of the sea claims, indicates that the
persistent objector rule is alive and well, at least for law of the sea issues. Undoubtedly
there are thousands of protests filed annually on many issues in the chancelleries, few if
any of which are published. It cannot therefore be assumed, as some commentators do,
that the rule of the persistent objector is in desuetude.
232. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 62, § 313 cmt. b; BROWNLIE, supra note 149,
at 611.
233. See, e.g., Genocide Reservations Case, supra note 149, 1951 I.CJ. at 32 (Guer-
rero, Vice Pres.; Hsu Mo, McNair, Read, JJ., dissenting); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), sUpra note
62, § 313 r.n.1; BROWNLIE, supra note 149, at 609; McNAIR, supra note 149, at 169; 1
OPPENI-,EIM's INT'L L., supra note 1, § 616, at 1245; SINCIR, supra note 100, at 54-55.
234. See infra notes 253-315 and accompanying text.
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declare a shift within policy; for example, what was not considered a
proper circumstance for claiming anticipatory self-defense yesterday is
now considered within the scope of a proper claim today. Such a shift in
policy might, at the least, cause discomfort among treaty partners, and at
worst, trigger denunciations, claims of treaty breach, fundamental change
of circumstances, or impossibility of performance. 235
The second issue involves the attacking state's posture. If an attacking
state, a target state, and an assisting state share common self-defense posi-
tions, then this would tend to legitimize assisting state operations as a
manifestation of local, or special, custom. 23 6 If the assisting and target
states take one view of the issue, and the attacking state takes another, this
might be grounds for a claim that an opponent has not engaged in legiti-
mate action. Thus, if an assisting state wishes to assert that it is acting
within the law, it could more safely do so if it acts according to its alies' or
opponents' views. Where a state has an anticipatory self-defense view, this
might mean employing military force in only a reactive self-defense mode,
or at least claiming to do so, if the opponent or target state has adopted the
restrictive view. This is a policy decision and not a question of law; it is
akin to using more restrictive rules of engagement (ROE) than those per-
mitted by law. ROE for combat forces may provide for wartime and peace-
time scenarios in which rights to individual or collective self-defense,
including anticipatory self-defense, may be more circumscribed than the
law would allow. 237
Many of these issues do not find responses in reported practice or
decisional law.
B. The War Crimes Trials and Self-Defense
The Nuremberg International Military Tribunal relied on the Pact of Paris
in its findings of guilt.2 3 8 The Tribunal rejected defense claims that Ger-
235. See supra notes 225-27 and accompanying text. Although Iceland's claims of
fundamental change in law were rejected, Fisheries Jurisdiction, supra note 226, 1973
I.CJ. at 16-21, did not discount the possibility that a large enough change in law could
be grounds for a change of circumstances claim.
236. Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.CJ. 266,277; Right of Passage Over Indian Terr.
(Port. v. India), 1960 L.CJ. 6; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 62, § 102 cmt. e; BROWN-
LIE, supra note 149, at 9-10; 1 OPPENHEIM's INT'L L., supra note 1, § 10, at 30.
237. ROE state options for, and possibly limits on, actions a commander may take in
armed conflict situations. In U.S. practice, commanders are strongly reminded of their
duty to defend their ship, unit, etc., i.e., to exercise self-defense, including anticipatory
self-defense, pursuant to U.S. policy. See generally BRADD C. HAYES, NAVAL RULES OF
ENGAGEMENT: MANAGEMENT TooLs FOR CmSIS (1989); J. Ashley Roach, Rules of Engage-
ment, 36 NAy. WAR C. Ray. 46 (No. 1, 1983), reprinted in 14 SYRACUsaJ. INT'L L. & COM.
865 (1988); Ivan A. Shearer, Rules of Engagement and the Implementation of the Law of
Naval Warfare, reprinted in 14 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 767 (1988); supra note 1 and
accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 10, 136-52 and accompanying text. McCoRMACK, supra note 1, at
253-61, has extensive, helpful analysis of the trials. See also ALEXANDROV, supra note 1,
at 73-76.
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many had acted in self-defense. 239 Admiral Erich Raeder's theory was that
Germany occupied Norway as a necessary act of self-defense to forestall
Allied landings there. Citing the Caroline Case,240 the Tribunal recognized
a right of anticipatory self-defense: "[Pjreventative action in foreign terri-
tory is justified only in the case of an instant and overwhelming necessity
for self-defense, leaving no choice of means and no moment for delibera-
tion."24 1 The Tribunal found that this was not true for German invasions
of Denmark and Norway. 242 The defense was unable to demonstrate "an
intention formed in good faith and honesty of conviction to protect one's
own safety, that safety being immediately threatened. '243
In the Tokyo trials involving accused Japanese war criminals, a defense
was that because the Netherlands had declared war on Japan before Japan
had made a formal war declaration, 244 attacks against Dutch Asian territo-
ries constituted self-defense. The Tribunal held the Netherlands had acted
in anticipatory self-defense:
The fact that the Netherlands .... fully apprised of the imminence of the
attack [by Japan], in self-defense declared war against Japan on 8th Decem-
ber and thus officially recognised the existence of a state of war which had
been begun by Japan, cannot change that war from a war of aggression [by]
... Japan into something other than that.2 45
There was strong evidence of Japan's preparations to invade the Dutch East
Indies, and the Netherlands chose to declare war before Japan's formal dec-
laration. The Netherlands did not then have self-defense treaties with the
Allies, insofar as the published record shows. However, the fact that the
Netherlands acted in concert with the Allies immediately afterward is some
evidence of informal collective self-defense, a concept recognized before
and after ratification of the Charter.246
These decisions, coming just after the General Assembly had con-
239. United States v. Goering, 17 Tr. Maj. War Crim. Before Int'l M. Trib. 458, 469
(1948), 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 172 (argument of Prof. Dr. Hermann Jahreiss, counsel for
defendant Albert Jodl).
240. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
241. Nuremberg Judgment, 1 Tr. Maj. War Crim. Before Int'l M. Trib. at 208, 218-22,
41 AM. J. INT'L L. at 205, 207.
242. The Tribunal also dismissed arguments, based on Secretary of State Kellogg's
comments on the self-defense reservation to the Pact of Paris, supra note 11, that Ger-
many alone could judge the legitimacy of its own self-defense claim. Nuremberg Judg-
ment, 1 Tr. Maj. War Crim. Before Int'l M. Trib. at 218-22, 41 AM.J. INT'L L. at 207. See
also McCoRMAcK, supra note 1, at 254-56; supra notes 136-52 and accompanying text.
243. BowT, supra note 1, at 143. See also McCoRmvcK, supra note 1, at 254-56.
244. Cf. Hague III, supra note 47, arts. 1, 3, 36 Stat. at 2271. Japan ratified Hague III
in 1911, the Netherlands in 1909. DIETRICH SCHINDLER & JIRI TOmAN, THE LAws OF
ARMED CONFLICTS: A COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER DOcUMENTs
60 (3d ed. 1988).
245. United States v. Araki, Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the
Far East (Nov. 4-12, 1948), reprinted in 1 THE TOKYO JUDGMENT: THE INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST (I.M.T.F.E.) 29 APRIL 1946-12 NOVEMBER 1948, at
382 (B.V.A. R61ing & C.F. Riuter eds., 1977).
246. Id. at 15, 21. See also ALEXANDROV, supra note 1, at 76; McCom xcx, supra note
1, at 258-59.
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firmed the Nuremberg Charter as customary law,24 7 strongly evidence 248 a
right of anticipatory self-defense and perhaps, for the Netherlands, the
practice of informal collective self-defense arrangements.
C. Anticipatory Collective Self-Defense at the Creation of the
U.N. System
The record during and just after World War II does not show that the law
of collective self-defense, including anticipatory collective self-defense, was
different than before the war. The Charter drafters included a right of col-
lective self-defense, largely at the behest of parties to the Act of Chapulte-
pec, but they did so in the context of the Pact of Paris, the Locarno Treaties,
and other agreements, such as Nyon 249 and bilateral treaties in 1935 and
thereafter.250 Invoking collective self-defense under the Charter could
come through formal treaty, informal arrangement, or by the target state's
request. 251 Problems of varying views on the scope of self-defense within
these modalities were not resolved when this norm was written into the
Charter.252 The Nuremberg and Tokyo judgments were not handed down
until after the Charter was in force, but they confirm a right of anticipatory
self-defense.
IV. Collective Self-Defense Treaties During the Charter Era
Bilateral and multilateral defense agreements have been concerned with
collective self-defense since 1945.253 Article 51 states a right and not a
duty of self-defense; however, the right is transformed into a duty in self-
defense treaties.254 Section A of this Part discusses these arrangements.
Section B argues that national decision-makers should be bound by what
they knew, or should have known, at the time the decision to respond in
anticipatory self-defense is made, the standard for the law of armed con-
flict, that is the jus in bello.
247. G.A. Res. 95(1), supra note 142.
248. L.J. STATtrE, art. 38(1)(d); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 62, § 103(2). Most
municipal legal systems recognize a right of anticipatory self-defense. McCORMACK,
supra note 1, at 271. This adds more weight to a view that the right exists in interna-
tional law. l.J. STATUTE, art. 38(1)(c). But see RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra, § 103(2).
249. See supra notes 74, 163-68 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 178-98 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 18, 39-44, 163-68, 178-98, 219, 245 and accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 207-21 and accompanying text.
253. Part IV does not examine practice under the agreements. Others have examined
such practice. See generally, e.g., ALEXANDROV, supra note 1, at 215-90; GOODRICH ET AL.,
supra note 5, at 345-48; McCoRmAcK, supra note 1, at 211-39. These discuss better-
known situations. JAMEs CABLE, GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY 1919-1991 at 178-213 (4th ed.
1994) demonstrates that smaller incidents since 1945 that may involve bilateral or occa-
sionally multilateral responses may supply more content to practice than is now avail-
able. Part IV does not consider the right, recognized under the Charter and in pre-
Charter times, for states to use arrangements less formal than a treaty to assert collective
self-defense, including anticipatory self-defense. See supra notes 18, 39-44, 219, 245
and accompanying text.
254. ALExANDROv, supra note 1, at 102; Tucker, supra note 1, at 33.
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A. Treaties Providing for Collective Self-Defense
The Act of Chapultepec, instrumental in shaping article 51 of the Char-
ter,25 5 was replaced by the Rio Treaty (1947), whose article 3(1) provides
that an armed attack on an American state is considered an attack on all
American states and that each party would undertake to assist in meeting
the attack "in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defense recognized by article 51."256 Article 3(1) is nearly identical
with Part 1(3) of the Act. 25 7 Undoubtedly, the Treaty drafters wished to
carry forward the meaning of the inherent right of self-defense incorpo-
rated in the Act in 1945 through article 51.258
The Treaty also declares that "[o]n the request of the State or States
directly attacked" and until there is a decision by the Inter-American Sys-
tem's Organ of Consultation, each party may determine "immediate meas-
ures" that it will take to fulfil the collective self-defense obligation.25 9
These self-defense measures can proceed until the U.N. Security Council
takes measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.260
If any American state's inviolability, territorial integrity, sovereignty or
political independence is affected by aggression (that falls short of an
armed attack), by a conflict, "or by any other fact or situation that might
endanger the peace of America," the Treaty's Organ of Consultation must
meet immediately.2 6 1 The Members must then agree on measures to be
255. See supra notes 205-20 and accompanying text.
256. Rio Treaty, supra note 205, art. 3(1), 62 Stat. at 1700, 21 U.N.T.S. at 95.
257. Compare Rio Treaty, supra note 205, art. 3(1), 62 Stat. at 1700, 21 U.N.T.S. at 95,
with Act of Chapultepec, supra note 205, Parts 1(3), III, 60 Stat. at 1839-40. The Treaty
applies within North and South America and adjoining oceans. Rio Treaty, supra, arts.
3(3), 4, 62 Stat. at 1700-01, 21 U.N.T.S. at 97. Act of Chapultepec, supra, Parts 1(3), II,
60 Stat. at 1839-40, had provisions similar to article 3(1) of the Treaty, but the Act
declared that provisions were subject to the projected international organization, i.e., the
United Nations, and had no specific geographic parameters of application, although the
whole tenor of the Act pointed toward Western Hemisphere self-defense. Cf. Canyes,
supra note 205, at 506. See also Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30,
1948 (OAS Charter), 2 U.S.T. 2394, 119 U.N.T.S. 3, amended by Protocol, Feb. 27,
1967, 21 U.S.T. 607; Protocol, Dec. 5, 1985, 21 I.L.M. 533 (1985). The OAS Charter
replaced the Pan American Union when the Act of Chapultepec was signed. The 1985
OAS protocol is not in force for all members, including the United States. MJ. BoWMAN
& DJ. HARRIS, MULTILATERAL TREATIES: INDEX AND CuRIENT STATUs 177 (11th Cum.
Supp. 1995). For history of inter-American relations in the Pan American Union, OAS
and Rio Treaty contexts, see generally M. MARGARET BALL, THE OAS IN TRANSITION (1969);
GORDON CONNELL-SMITH, THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM (1966); STOE-ZER, supra note 18;
ANN VAN WYNEN THOMAS & AJ. THOMAS, JR., THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES
(1963); Charles G. Fenwick, The Inter-American Regional System: Fifty Years of Progress,
50 AM. J. INT'L L. 18 (1956).
258. See supra notes 204-07 and accompanying text.
259. Rio Treaty, supra note 205, art. 3(2), 62 Stat. at 1700, 21 U.N.T.S. at 96-97; Act
of Chapultepec, supra note 205, had no counterpart.
260. Rio Treaty, supra note 205, art. 3(4), 62 Stat. at 1700, 21 U.N.T.S. at 97. See also
id. art. 5, 62 Stat. at 1701, 21 U.N.T.S. at 97; U.N. CHARTER art. 51. Rio Treaty, art. 1, 62
Stat. at 1700, 21 U.N.T.S. at 95, pledges that parties will not threaten or use force incon-
sistent with the Charter. Cf. U.N. CHARTER arts. 2(4), 103; supra notes 137, 212 and
accompanying text.
261. Rio Treaty, supra note 205, art. 6, 62 Stat. at 1701, 21 U.N.T.S. at 97-99.
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taken, in case of aggression, to assist a victim of such aggression, or meas-
ures that should be taken for common defense and for maintaining peace
and security.2 6
2
The 1948 treaty that formed the Western European Union provides
similarly that if a party is "the object of an armed attack in Europe, the
other... Parties will, in accordance with... Article 51 .... afford the Party
so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power."
263
The Treaty provides for a Consultative Council "[flor . . . consulting.
together on all the questions dealt with in the... Treaty,... which shall be
organized as to be able to exercise its functions continuously."2 64 The
1948 agreement also provides for reporting to the Security Council and
ending WEU action when the Council takes measures necessary to main-
tain or restore international peace and security. Nothing in the Treaty
"prejudice[s] in any way the obligations of the... Parties under the...
Charter .... -2 65 Nothing in the Treaty indicates that its drafters failed to
consider that they were carrying forward the understanding of the Charter
drafters, that is, that WEU states can invoke the inherent right of self-
defense. Indeed, the Treaty's explicit reference to article 51 tends to con-
firm this point. The 1954 WEU Protocols provide for forces to be contrib-
uted for self-defense. 266 Protocol I declares that parties "shall work in
close co-operation" with NATO, and that the Council and its agency will
rely on NATO military authorities for information and advice.2 67 The
262. Id. Article 9 defined aggression as including:
a. Unprovoked armed attack by a State against the territory, the people, or
the land, sea or air forces of another State; [and]
b. Invasion, by the armed forces of a State, of the territory of an American
State, through the trespassing of boundaries demarcated in accordance with a
treaty, judicial decision, or arbitral award,or, [absent] ... frontiers thus demar-
cated, invasion affecting a region.., under the effective jurisdiction of another
State.
Id. art. 9. Cf. Act of Chapultepec, supra note 205, Parts I(3)-I(4), 60 Stat. at 1839.
263. Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-
Defence, Mar. 17, 1948, art. 4, 19 U.N.T.S. 51, 57 [hereinafter WEU Treaty], amended
by Protocol Modifying Treaty for Collaboration in Economic, Social and Cultural Mat-
ters and for Collective Self-Defence, Oct. 23, 1954, 211 U.N.T.S. 342 [hereinafter WEU
Protocol 1]; Protocol on Forces of Western European Union, Oct. 23, 1954, 211 U.N.T.S.
358 [hereinafter WEU Protocol II]; Protocol on Control of Armaments, with Annexes,
Oct. 23, 1954, 211 U.N.T.S. 364; Protocol on the Agency of Western European Union
for Control of Armaments, Oct. 23, 1954, 211 U.N.T.S. 376; and other protocols in 1990
and 1992, which do not amend art. 4. See BowmAN & HAIuus, supra note 257, at 177
(11th Cum. Supp. 1995).
264. WEU Treaty, supra note 263, art. 7, 19 U.N.T.S. at 59. In 1955 the Council was
renamed the Council of Western European Union, but otherwise its functions remain
the same. Compare id. with WEU Protocol I, supra note 263, art. 8, 211 U.N.T.S. at 346.
265. Nothing in the Treaty can be interpreted as affecting the Council's authority and
responsibility under the Charter to take action it deems necessary to maintain or restore
international peace and security. WEU Treaty, supra note 263, art. 5, 19 U.N.T.S. at 59.
266. WEU Protocol II, supra note 263, 211 U.N.T.S. 364.
267. WEU Protocol I, supra note 263, art. 3, 211 U.N.T.S. at 346. The WEU was
moribund for more than 30 years, existing in the shadow of NATO, but it was revitalized
in 1986 to meet issues arising out of the Iran-Iraq war in the Persian Gulf. Europe's
Multilateral Organizations, 3 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 351, 354 (1992). The European Union
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WEU, inactive for more than three decades, was revived in 1984 in connec-
tion with European Union integration;268 the 1980-88 Tanker War also
spurred action.26 9
In 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty was signed. Article 5 provides in
part that:
[AIrmed attack against one or more of [the parties] in Europe or North
America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently
[the parties] agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in
exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by
article 51 ... will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith,
individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems
necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the
security of the North Atlantic area.2 70
Specific reference to article 51 carries forward an understanding that par-
ties possess inherent rights to individual and collective self-defense. Article
7 adds that the Treaty "does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as
affecting, in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the
Parties which are [U.N.] members..., or the primary responsibility of the
Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and secur-
has recognized WEU's security role. See generally Walker, Integration and Disintegration,
supra note 51, at 15-17.
268. See generally ALFRED CAHEN, THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION AND NATO 1016
(1989); THE CHANGING FUNCTIONS OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION (WEU) xiii-xxx
(Arie Bloed & Ramses A. Wessel eds. 1994) [hereinafter CHANGING FUNCTIONS]; STANLEY
R. SLOAN, NATO's FUTURE: TOWARD A NEw TRANSATLANTIC BARGAIN 173-75 (1985).
Treaty of Dunkirk, supra note 74, had been a WEU predecessor; other European states'
desire to accede was a catalyst for drafting the WEU Treaty. COOK, supra note 74, at
116, 122, 259-60. Ironically, a European Defense Community had been contemplated
as part of the then European Economic Community; it would have been "exclusively
defensive" but would have allowed response to any "armed aggression" against a mem-
ber state or European Defense Forces constituted under the Treaty. The Treaty pledged
cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Treaty Constituting the Euro-
pean Defence Community, May 27, 1952, arts. 2, 5, reprinted in NAvAL WAR COLLEGE,
INTERNATIONAL LAw DOCUMENTS 1952-53, at 147, 148-49 (1954); Karl Lowenstein, Sover-
eignty and International Co-Operation, 48 Am. J. INV'L L. 222, 237-38 (1954). The
Europeans failed to ratify the treaty, so it never entered into force. U.S. Secretary of State
John Foster Dulles, Statement to U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, 32 DEP'T ST.
BULL. 605, 606 (1955). The United States had not opposed the Treaty. Message of the
President of the United States Stating United States Position on Relation between the
European Defense Community and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Apr. 16,
1954, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1954, reprinted in NAvAL WAR COLLEGE, supra, at 232.
269. WEU Statement on Recent Events in the Gulf, Apr. 19, 1988, in CHANGING FUNC-
TIONS, supra note 268, at 81; CAHEN, supra note 268, at 47-50.
270. North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 95, art. 5, 63 Stat. at 2244, 34 U.N.T.S. at 246,
modified as to territory covered by Protocol on Accession of Greece and Turkey, supra
note 95, 3 U.S.T. 43, 126 U.N.T.S. 350. Article 6 defined the territory of the parties
covered by article 5. Id. art. 6. See also Protocol on Accession of Federal Republic of
Germany, supra note 95, 6 U.S.T. 5707, 243 U.N.T.S. 308; Protocol on Accession of
Spain, supra note 95, 34 U.S.T. 3510. These protocols do not affect the substance of
other terms of the North Atlantic Treaty. Currently NATO is in the process of admitting
new members in Eastern Europe. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
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ity."2 7 1 States also agree to "consult together whenever, in the opinion of
any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of
any . . . Part[y] is threatened."272
In 1950 the Arab League signed a Joint Defense Treaty, whose article
2 provides that:
Contracting States agree that an armed aggression, directed against any one
or more of them or against their forces, shall be considered as directed
against all.... [T]hey agree, in virtue of the right of legitimate self-defence,
both individual and collective, to assist at once the State or States so
attacked and to adopt immediately, both individually and collectively, all...
measures and means at their disposal, including. . . employment of armed
force, to repulse the aggression and restore peace and security.
2 73
The Security Council must be informed immediately of an aggression and
the steps and measures to be taken.2 74 Although it does not refer to article
51 specifically, the Treaty could not contravene individual and collective
self-defense rights proclaimed in the Charter.2 75 Article 3 also pledges:
States shall consult together at the request of any one of them, whenever the
integrity of the territory, independence or security of any one of them is
exposed to danger.
In the event of the imminent risk of war or the advent of a sudden inter-
national development believed to be dangerous, . . . States shall at once
hasten to coordinate their measures as the situation may require.
2 76
The latter clause directly supports a view that the inherent right of collec-
tive self-defense includes a right of anticipatory self-defense. That the
League contemplated more than reactive collective self-defense is also sup-
ported by the Treaty's Military Annex, article 1(a). The Permanent Military
Committee created by the Treaty is charged with "[p]repar[ing] ... military
plans to meet all foreseeable dangers or any armed aggression which might
271. North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 95, art. 7, 63 Stat. at 2244, 34 U.N.T.S. at 248.
See also U.N. CHARTER arts. 2(4), 103; supra notes 137, 212 and accompanying text.
272. North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 95, art. 4, 63 Stat. at 2242, 34 U.N.T.S. at 246.
See also HARmAN CLEVELAND, NATO: THE TRANSATLANTIC BARGAIN 13-33 (1970) (discuss-
ing "golden rule of consultation"). For NATO origins and development, see COOK, supra
note 74; ALFRED GROSSER, THE WESTERN ALLIANCE: EUROPEAN-AmERICAN RELATIONS SINCE
1945 (Michael Shaw trans. 1980); ROBERT ENDICOTT OSGOOD, NATO: THE ENTANGLING
ALLIANCE (1962); SLOAN, supra note 268;John Duffield, The North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation: Alliance Theory, in NGAIRE WOODS, EXPLAINING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SINCE
1945 ch. 15 (1996); Goodhart, supra note 209.
273. Treaty of Joint Defence and Economic Co-operation Between Arab States, with
Military Annex, June 17, 1950, art. 2, 157 Brit. & For. St. Pap. 669-70, 49 AM.J. INT'L L.
51 (Supp. 1955) [hereinafter Arab League Joint Defense Treaty].
274. Id. See also Pact of League of Arab States, Mar. 22, 1945, 70 U.N.T.S. 238; Hus-
SEIN A. HASSOUNA, THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES AND REGIONAL DisPuTES ch. 1 (1975);
MAJID KHADDURI, THE GULF WAR: THE ORIGINS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE IRAQ-IRAN CON-
FLICT 140 (1988); ROBERT W. MACDONALD, THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES (1965); Majid
Khadduri, The Arab League As a Regional Arrangement, 40 A. J. INT'L L. 756 (1946).
275. U.N. CHARTER art. 103. See also supra notes 137, 212 and accompanying text.
276. Arab LeagueJoint Defense Treaty, supra note 273, art. 3, 157 Brit. & For. St. Pap.
at 670, 49 Am. J. INT'L L. Supp. at 52.
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be attempted against one or more... Contracting States or their forces." 277
In 1951 Australia, New Zealand, and the United States concluded the
ANZUS Pact.278 Similar to other mutual security agreements, and modeled
on the North Atlantic Treaty, 2 79 the Pact provides for consultation.
280
There is "recogni[tion] that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any...
Part[y] would be dangerous to [other parties'] peace and safety."'281 Parties
will "meet the common danger in accordance with [their] constitutional
processes. '282 Like earlier agreements, there is a pledge of reporting to the
Security Council and ending self-defense measures once the Council takes
necessary measures. 283 Unlike the North Atlantic Treaty, however, there is
no statement that an attack on one is an attack on all. 28 4 Nevertheless, the
construction of the "armed attack" provision in article 4 should receive the
same construction as the phrase in article 51 of the Charter.285
The 1954 Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) includes simi-
lar language on aggression by armed attack: consultation after a threat to a
party's territory, sovereignty or political independence; and reporting to
the Security Council. The Treaty requires a government's invitation or con-
sent before the assisting state takes action on that member's territory.286
277. Id., Military Annex, art. 1(a), 157 Brit. & For. St. Pap. at 672, 49 AM. J. INT'L L.
Supp. at 53.
278. ANZUS Pact, supra note 219, 3 U.S.T. at 3423, 131 U.N.T.S. at 86 (suspended for
New Zealand, Sept. 1, 1986). McIryR'E, supra note 219, at 403-05; TIF, supra note 138,
at 350. For analysis of New Zealand's refusal to admit ships with nuclear capability and
ANZUS future prospects, see generally JACOB BERCOVITCH, ANZUS IN CRISIS (1988); FRANK
P. Do~nm, ANZUS IN REVISION (1991); MICHAEL C. PUGH, THE ANZUS CIsIs, NUCLEAR
VISITING AND DETERRENCE (1989); THOMAs-DuRRELL YOUNG, AUSTRALIAN, NEw ZEALAND,
AND UNITED STATES SECURITY RELATIONS, 1951-1986 (1992); W. Keith Jackson & James
W. Lamare, The ANZUS Conflict and New Zealand Politics, in INTERNATIONAL CRISIS AND
DOMESTIC POLITICS 53 (Lamare ed. 1991); Jock Phillips, New Zealand and the ANZUS
Alliance: Changing National Self-Perceptions, in AUSTRALIA, NEw ZEALAND, AND THE
UNITED STATES: INTERNAL CHANGE AND ALLIANCE RELATIONS IN THE ANZUS STATES 183
(Richard W. Baker ed. 1991); James N. Rosenau, Peripheral International Relationships in
a More Benign World: Reflections on American Orientations Toward ANZUS, in id. at 203.
279. STARKE, supra note 219, at 77.
280. ANZUS Pact, supra note 219, art. 3, 3 U.S.T. at 3423, 131 U.N.T.S. at 86.
281. Id. art. 4.
282. Id.
283. Id. Like the Rio Treaty and the NATO Agreement, the ANZUS Pact, id. art. 5, 3
U.S.T. at 3423, 131 U.N.T.S. at 86, limits its territorial scope to attacks on parties' met-
ropolitan territories, island territories under their jurisdiction, or their armed forces,
public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.
284. Compare ANZUS Pact, supra note 219, art. 4, 3 U.S.T. at 3423, 131 U.N.T.S. at
86, with North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 95, art. 5, 63 Stat. at 2244, 34 U.N.T.S. at 246.
Similar to the Rio and North Atlantic Treaties, supra notes 95, 205, ANZUS Pact, supra,
art. 5, 3 U.S.T. at 3423, 131 U.N.T.S. at 86, limits its territorial scope to attacks on
parties' metropolitan territories, island territories under their jurisdiction, and parties'
armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific. See also McINTYR, supra note 219,
chs. 11-15; REESE, supra note 219, ch. 8; STARKE, supra note 219, chs. 1-2; Leicester C.
Webb, Australia and SEATO, in GEORGE MODELSII, SEATO: Six STUDIES 47, 50-57 (1964).
As of 1965 there had been no NATO-ANZUS liaison. STARKE, supra note 219, at 226-28.
285. STARKE, supra note 219, at 121.
286. It did not include application to parties' armed forces or public vessels or air-
craft. Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, with Protocol, Sept. 8, 1954, arts. 4, 8, 6
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The Pacific Charter (1954) declares the determination of its parties to pre-
vent or counter by appropriate means any attempt in the treaty area to
subvert their freedom or to destroy their sovereignty or territorial integ-
rity."287 Although SEATO Treaty obligations remain in effect, its support-
ing organization ceased to exist in 1975.288 France, the United Kingdom,
and the United States are among the SEATO and Pacific Charter
members. 28 9
The Second Balkan Pact, signed in 1954,290 served as a partial succes-
sor to the 1933 Little Entente;291 however, its effective life lasted only a
couple of years.292 Like its predecessor, the Pact pledged not only consul-
tation but "immediate . . ." collective defense against "armed aggression,"
invoking article 51 of the Charter.293 Thus, if Pact parties had asserted
individual claims to anticipatory self-defense, they would have incorpo-
rated those claims by joining the Pact.2 94
In 1955, some Arab League members signed the Baghdad Pact. 295
Article 1 declared: "Consistent with article 51 ... Parties will co-operate
U.S.T. 81, 83-84, 209 U.N.T.S. 28, 30, 32 (SEATO Treaty). See also LEszEm BuszyNsia,
SEATO: THE FAILURE OF AN ALLIANCE STRATEGY chs. 1-2 (1983); STARKE, supra note 219,
at 221-26; George Modelski, SEATO: Its Function and Organization, in MODELSKI, supra
note 284, at 8-45.
287. Pacific Charter, Sept. 8, 1954, 6 U.S.T. 91, 209 U.N.T.S. 23, 24.
288. BowiMm & HARRIS, supra note 257, at 196; BuszYNsia, supra note 286, ch. 6.
289. See TIF, supra note 138, at 350.
290. Treaty of Alliance, Political Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, Aug. 9, 1§54,
211 U.N.T.S. 239 [hereinafter Second Balkan Pact]. A cooperation and friendship treaty
among Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia had been signed a year later. See generally JOHN
0. IATRIDES, BALKAN TRIANGLE (1968). See also J.KS. GRENVILLE & BERNARD WASSERSTEIN,
THE MAJOR INTERNATIONAL TREAnES SINCE 1945, at 390-91 (1987) [hereinafter GRENviLLE
& WASSERSTEIN]; Gerhard Bebr, Regional Organizations: A United Nations Problem, 49
Am. J. INT'L L. 166, 182 (1955).
291. Little Entente, supra note 154.
292. By 1956, the arrangement was in ruins; by 1962, it was a dead letter. See gener-
ally Bebr, supra note 290, at 182; GRENVILLE & WASSERSTEIN, supra note 290, at 390-91;
IATRIDES, supra note 290.
293. Second Balkan Pact, supra note 290.
294. The Parties' obligations under the Pact were subject to those owed to other alli-
ances, for example, the North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 95 (delimiting the obligations
of Greece or Turkey). The Pact required consultation among members for conflicts in
these obligations. Compare Second Balkan Pact, supra note 290, arts. 2, 6-7, 10, 211
U.N.T.S. at 241-45, with Pact of Organisation of the Little Entente, supra note 154, arts.
10-11, 139 L.N.T.S. at 239. Whether consultation was prerequisite before action is
debatable; a foreign minister for a party state said that consultation would not be an
obstacle, since all joint plans had been prepared and would be applied when joint meas-
ures were decided. IATRIDES, supra note 290, at 139.
295. Pact for Mutual Co-operation, Feb. 24, 1955, 233 U.N.T.S. 199 [hereinafter Bagh-
dad Pact]. Arab League members included Iran, Iraq (1955-59), Turkey, and the United
Kingdom. For the origins and history of the Baghdad Pact, see ROYAL INsTITUTE OF INrER-
NATIONAL AFFAIRS, THE BAGHDAD PACT: ORIGINS AND POLmcAL SETTING (Feb. 1956); Brian
Holden Reid, The "Northern Tier" and the Baghdad Pact, in THE FOREIGN POLICY OF
CHURCHILL'S PEACErIME ADMINISTRATION 1951-55, at 159-74 (John W. Young ed., 1988);
Margaret Muryani Manchester, The Tangled Web: The Baghdad Pact, Eisenhower, and
Arab Nationalism chs. 1-3 (1994) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Clark University)
(on file with the Naval War College Library).
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for their security and defence," perhaps through special agreements. 296
Unlike the North Atlantic and other treaties, it did not provide for crisis
consultation by an agreement to determine measures to take once the Pact
became effective.2 97 A political failure, the Pact dissolved in 1979.298
In 1955, the USSR and its European satellites signed the now-
defunct2 99 Warsaw Pact.300 Its article 4 paralleled the North Atlantic
Treaty:3 01
In the event of an armed attack in Europe on one or more of the...
Parties ... by any State or group of States, each ... Party ... shall, in the
exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence, in accordance
with article 51 .... afford the State or States so attacked immediate assist-
ance, individually and in agreement with the other ... Parties .... by all the
means it considers necessary, including ... armed force. . . . Parties...
shall consult together immediately concerning the joint measures necessary
to restore and maintain international peace and security.
Measures taken under this article shall be reported to the Security
Council in accordance with the... Charter. These measures shall be discon-
tinued as soon as the ... Council takes the necessary action to restore and
maintain international peace and security.30 2
Pact parties also pledged to consult immediately to provide for joint
defense and to maintain international peace and security if a member "con-
sider[ed] that a threat of armed attack on one or more of the... Parties to
the Treaty ha[d] arisen."30 3 Similarly, the North Atlantic Treaty provides
for consultations if a party believes a member state's territorial integrity,
political independence or security is threatened. 30 4
Cold War era bilateral defense treaties also contained similar language
acknowledging anticipatory collective self-defense. Three such treaties
296. Baghdad Pact, supra note 295, at 212. See also Declaration Respecting Baghdad
Pact, July 28, 1958, 1 1, 9 U.S.T. 1077, 335 U.N.T.S. 205, 206 (declaring the parties'
"determination to maintain their collective security and to resist aggression, direct or
indirect.").
297. Although the agreement possessed no territorial limitation, confining the treaty
to Arab League members effectively excluded all but the Middle East and Northern
Africa. See Baghdad Pact, supra note 295, arts. 2, 5, 233, U.N.T.S. at 212-14.
298. The United States was a "de facto" member but not a Pact party. See Declaration
Respecting the Baghdad Pact, supra note 296, at 197; Reid, supra note 295, at 159-80;
Manchester, supra note 295, at 336-45.
299. Cf. Protocol, Mar. 31, 1991, in BOWMAN & HARIS, supra note 257, at 196 (11th
Cum. Supp. 1995).
300. Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance, May 14, 1955, 219
U.N.T.S. 24 [hereinafter Warsaw Pact]. For analysis of origins and practice under the
Warsaw Pact, see generally NEIL FODOR, THE WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION: A POLITICAL
AND ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS (1990); J.P. JAIN, DOCUMENTARY STUDY OF THE WARSAW
PACT 1-39 (1973). For an overview of the Soviet system, including the Warsaw Pact, see
Mark Kramer, The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: Spheres of Influence, in WOODS,
supra note 272, ch. 5.
301. Compare Warsaw Pact, supra note 300, with North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 95,
arts. 5, 7, 63 Stat. at 2244, 34 U.N.T.S. at 246-48.
302. Warsaw Pact, supra note 300, art. 4, at 28.
303. Id. art. 3, at 28.
304. Compare Warsaw Pact, supra note 300, art. 3, at 28, with North Atlantic Treaty,
supra note 95, art. 4, 63 Stat. at 2244, 34 U.N.T.S. at 246.
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binding the United States are typical. The Philippines Mutual Defense
Treaty declares that "[e]ach Party recognizes that an armed attack in the
Pacific Area on either... Part[y] would be dangerous to its own peace and
security and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in
accordance with its constitutional processes."30 5 In common with the mul-
tilateral treaties, the Philippines-U.S. agreement pledges reporting to the
Security Council and ending defense measures when the Council takes
"measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and
security."30 6 Armed attacks are deemed to include attacks on metropoli-
tan territories of either state, island territories under their jurisdiction, or
their armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific. 30 7 Like the mul-
tilaterals, the parties pledge to consult "whenever in the opinion of either of
them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of either
... is threatened by external armed attack in the Pacific."30 8 The agree-
ments with Korea 30 9 and Japan3 1° have similar terms.
The USSR concluded bilateral agreements with its European satellites
to defend against "aggression," sometimes naming Germany as the possi-
ble aggressor, or building on World War II arrangements. The Warsaw
305. Mutual Defense Treaty, Aug. 30, 1951, Phil.-U.S., art. 4, 3 U.S.T. 3947, 3950,
177 U.N.T.S. 133, 136 [hereinafter Philippines Defense Treaty].
306. Id.
307. Id. art. 5, 3 U.S.T. at 3950, 177 U.N.T.S. at 136.
308. Id. art. 3, at 136.
309. Mutual Defense Treaty, Oct. 1, 1953, Repub. of Korea-U.S., arts. 2-3, 5 U.S.T.
2368, 2372-73, 238 U.N.T.S. 199, 203-041. Cf. Philippines Defense Treaty, supra note
305, arts. 3-5, 3 U.S.T. at 3950, 177 U.N.T.S. at 136.
310. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, with Agreed Minute and Exchange
of Notes, Jan. 19, 1960 Japan-U.S., [hereinafter Japan Defense Treaty], arts. 4-5, 11
U.S.T. 1632, 1634, 373 U.N.T.S. 179, 188. Cf. Philippines Defense Treaty, supra note
305, arts. 3-5, 11 U.S.T. at 3950, 177 U.N.T.S. at 136. The Japan Defense Treaty
replaced Security Treaty, Sept. 8, 1951, Japan-U.S., 3 U.S.T. 3329, 136 U.N.T.S. 211.
Japan has moved to a policy of offshore land, sea, and air defense from its earlier strat-
egy of defense at the water's edge. This shift seems to mark a change to a more anticipa-
tory self-defense mode. See generally Japan-United States, Joint Statement on Review of
Defense Cooperation Guidelines and Defense Cooperation Guidelines, Sept. 23, 1997,
reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 1621 (1997); PErERJ. KATZENSTEIN, CULTURAL NoRms AND NATIONAL
SECURITY: POLICE AND MILITARY IN POSTVARJAPAN 132-38 (1996); Mike M. Mochizuki, A
New Bargain for a Stronger Alliance, in TOWARD A TRUE ALLIANCE: RESTRUCTURING U.S.-
JAPAN SEcURITY RELATIONS ch. 1 (Mike M. Mochizuki ed., 1997). The Mutual Defense
Treaty, Dec. 2, 1954, Repub. of China-U.S., with U.S. Reservations, arts. 4-5, 6 U.S.T.
433, 436, 248 U.N.T.S. 213, 215 included the same kind of terms as the Japan Defense
Treaty; the United States, however, denounced it when it recognized the Peoples' Repub-
lic of China. See generally Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). See also GRENVILLE
& WASSERSTEIN, supra note 290, at 109-13 (noting U.S. Senate reservations to the China
treaty forbade U.S. action unless China was forced to fight in self-defense or territorial
extension of the U.S. commitment without Senate approval). If the United States negoti-
ated formal agreements with Persian Gulf states other than Kuwait after Iraq's invasion
of Kuwait in 1990, these bilateral treaties may provide for anticipatory collective self-
defense. The Kuwait-U.S. agreement was a reactive defense treaty, since it had been
invaded by the time the United States negotiated with Kuwait. These treaties have not
been and may never be published for national security reasons. See George K. Walker,
The Crisis Over Kuwait, August 1990-February 1991, 1991 DuKEJ. COMP. & INT'L L. 25,
29-30. See also RESTATEmENT (THIRD), supra note 62, § 312 r.n.5; supra note 62 and
accompanying text.
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Pact was not intended to supersede these treaties. 3 1 1 Similarly, Britain and
France ratified the Treaty of Dunkirk (1947)312 before the WEU was
formed.3 13 The Treaty says it was designed to prevent Germany from
becoming a "menace to the peace" again and, like the abortive Versailles
bilateral agreements, promised mutual support if Germany committed
aggression. 3 14 Depending on the definition of aggression, 3 15 the plain lan-
guage of these agreements supports a view that they contemplated anticipa-
tory and reactive self-defense, despite some states' policy of reactive self-
defense.
Without exception, these agreements require consultation when there
is a threat to a party's territorial integrity, political independence, security
or the like. Except for the ANZUS Pact,3 16 these agreements say that an
armed attack on one party is an attack on all. All refer to Charter require-
ments of reporting to the Security Council.
Do these terms leave room for anticipatory collective self-defense as a
response to a threat? Under a restrictive view of self-defense, that a target
state must await the first blow, 3 17 article 51 allows response by State A
after State B, with whom State A has a mutual self-defense treaty, has been
311. See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance, Mar. 18, 1948, BuIg.-
USSR, art. 2, 48 U.N.T.S. 135, 144 [hereinafter Bulgaria Treaty].
If either party is involved in hostilities with Germany which might seek to renew
its policy of aggression or with any other State... associated with Germany in a
policy of aggression either directly or indirectly or in any other way, the other
... shall immediately extend to the... Party involved in hostilities military and
other assistance with all the means at its disposal[, subject to the Charter].
Id. Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Cooperation, June 12, 1964, G.D.R.-
USSR, art. 5, 3 I.L.M. 754, 756 (1965); (treaty subject to Warsaw Pact, supra note 300).
See also FODOR, supra note 300, at 5-6, 188-91; GRENVILLE & WASSERSTIN, supra note
290, at 185;JMAN, supra note 300, at 13-14; Bowett, Collective Self-Defence, supra note 209,
at 144; W.W. Kulski, The Soviet System of Collective Security Compared with the Western
System, 44 AM. J. INT'L L. 453 (1950). The Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual
Assistance, Feb. 14, 1950, P.R.C.-USSR, art. 1, 226 U.N.T.S. 3, 12-14, had language like
the Bulgaria Treaty, supra, but saw Japan as the potential adversary. See also GRENVILLE
& WASSERSTEIN, supra note 290, at 158-59. USSR satellites also negotiated agreements
among themselves, subject to the Warsaw Pact, supra note 300. See, e.g., Treaty on
Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, Apr. 5, 1967, G.D.R.-Pol., arts. 4-5, 6
I.L.M. 514 (1968).
312. Treaty of Dunkirk, supra note 74, 9 U.N.T.S. 187.
313. WEU Treaty, supra note 263, 19 U.N.T.S. 51.
314. Treaty of Dunkirk, supra note 74, preamble, arts. 1-2, 9 U.N.T.S. at 188-92 (pred-
ecessor to the WEU Treaty, supra note 263). See also COOK, supra note 74, at 75, 114,
116, 122, 259-60; GROSSER, supra note 272, at 84-85; supra notes 275-81 and accompa-
nying text. Countries part of Western alliance systems concluded agreements, too; some
seem to contemplate only reactive self-defense obligations. See, e.g., Alliance Treaty, July
29, 1953, Libya-U.K., arts. 2-3, 186 U.N.T.S. 185, 192 (requiring consultation for an
"imminent menace of hostilities"; also describing troop basing rights). Nonaligned
states negotiated bilateral agreements. See, e.g., Defense Agreement, May 30, 1967,
United Arab Rep.-Jordan, art. 1, 6 I.L.M. 516 (1968) (including collective defense against
"armed aggression"). See also GRENVILLE & WASSERSTEIN, supra note 290, at 348, 361.
315. See generally Walker, Maritime Neutrality, supra note 171, at 131-40.
316. ANZUS Pact, supra note 219.
317. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
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attacked. Assuming there is a right of anticipatory self-defense, 318 State B
could respond before receiving the first blow, subject to necessity and pro-
portionality principles.319 The remaining question is whether State A,
which has not been attacked, could respond to an attack on State B and
successfully claim anticipatory collective self-defense.
For reasons grounded in Charter law, the language of the collective
self-defense treaties themselves, the history of collective self-defense agree-
ment negotiations, and the practical realities of modern methods of war-
fare, 320 there is a right to anticipatory collective self-defense in the Charter
era. If consultation must occur before a self-defense response, as most
agreements require,321 nothing in the agreements forbids consultation
before the first blow is struck. Oppenheim points out "[tihe right of Mem-
bers of the United Nations to prepare in advance for collective defence is
implicit in their right to have recourse to collective defence."322 Since a
right to collective self-defense is a customary norm in terms of the treaties
and practice before the Charter,323 it is implicit in that customary right as
well. Consultation or planning can include measures to be taken in antici-
patory collective self-defense. The Charter does not forbid planning for
individual or collective self-defense, regardless of whether the response be
reactive or anticipatory in nature.
Article 51 of the Charter, a treaty that has its first and primary princi-
ple and purpose as the maintenance of "international peace and secur-
ity,"32 4 lists the alternative rights of individual or collective self-defense.
318. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
319. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
320. See McCoRMACK, supra note 1, at 131; Mullerson & Scheffer, supra note 1, at
110-11. See 2 O'CoN-LL, supra note 4, at 1101; O'CONNELL, supra note 1, at 3. Recog-
nizing this over two decades earlier, O'Connell had concluded, however, that navies were
coming to a reactive view of self-defense. See id. at 83, 171. But see 2 O'CoNNLmL, supra
note 4, at 1101 (suggesting that the author would hold a different view today). See also
supra note 4 and accompanying text.
321. See, e.g., supra notes 205, 237 and accompanying text. The principal exception
appears to be the now defunct Baghdad Pact, supra note 295. See also supra notes 295-98
and accompanying text.
322. 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, § 52aa, at 157.
323. See supra notes 140-42, 242-45 and accompanying text. In fact, most states are
U.N. Members today. A customary collective self-defense right, however, may be
claimed if the Charter does not apply. See generally Nicaragua Case, supra note 1; supra
notes 137, 212 and accompanying text.
324. U.N. CHARTER art. 1(1). See also GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 5, at 25-26, citing
Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.CJ. 151, 213-15 (sep. opin. of Fitzmau-
rice, J.); Louis B. SOHN, BROADENING THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN PREVENTING,
MITIGATING OR ENDING INTERNATIONAL OR INTERNAL CoNFIucTs THAT THREATEN INTERNA-
TIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY 5-6 (Int'l R. of L. Center Occasional Papers, 2d Ser., No. 1,
1997) (stating Charter drafters felt that the United Nations' "first purpose" was main-
taining international peace and security). Reference in Art. 1(1) to the maintenance of
international peace and security through collective measures has meant collective secur-
ity through the U.N. system. See GOODRICH Er AL., supra, at 51-52; SIMMA, supra note 1, at
51-52. A right of collective self-defense is not inconsistent with or subordinate to Art.
I(1)'s declaration that states should seek dispute resolution through collective measures
within the U.N. system, for instance, through Security Council action. U.N. CHARTER art.
1(1). Article 51 of the Charter preserves an "inherent right of... collective self-defence"
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The same conditions applying to individual self-defense - necessity and
proportionality - apply to collective self-defense. 325 Thus, a right of col-
lective self-defense is coterminous with a right of individual self-defense.
Likewise, if individual self-defense includes anticipatory self-defense as
commentators and states argue,32 6 collective self-defense includes that
option too.
Given the history of negotiations contemporaneous with the Charter
from the Act of Chapultepec3 27 and running through the Rio Treaty
(1947), the WEU Treaty (1948), the North Atlantic Treaty (1949), the Arab
League Joint Defense Treaty (1950), and more recent agreements, there is
evidence in the language of the agreements themselves, particularly with
respect to consultations to deter aggression, including armed aggres-
sion,3 28 to support a view that negotiators had anticipatory self-defense in
mind. When the Charter's recognition of sovereignty is combined with the
"inherent" right of self-defense and the supremacy of Charter law over
inconsistent treaties,3 29 parties could not contract away an inherent right
of self-defense, including collective self-defense, guaranteed by the Charter.
And because the Charter negotiators operated against a background of
prior treaty law, practice, judicial opinions and commentators' views sup-
porting a right of anticipatory self-defense, that right in the collective self-
defense context carried forward into the Charter era.
B. The Temporal Problem: When Does Liability Accrue?
Convictions at Nuremberg were based on what defendants knew, or should
have known, when they decided to invade other states.3 30 Since then there
have been no authoritative statements on whether liability accrues based
on what decision makers know, or should know, when a reactive or antici-
patory self-defense response is contemplated. Commentators have been
tempted to justify opinions, at least in part, on evidence available after a
decision, perhaps even years later.3 3 1
until the Council acts. This is buttressed by the continuing vitality of the principle of
national sovereignty, also stated in the Charter. U.N. CHARTER art. 51. See generally
U.N. CI-uRER art. 2(1); S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.IJ. (ser. A) No. 10, at 4, 18;
U.N. Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace: Report of the Secretary-General on the Work
of the Organization, U.N. Doc. A/47/277, S/24111 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 956,
959 (1992); MICHA EL AKEHURST, A MODERN IrraoDucToN TO INTERNATIONAL LAw 21-23
(Brian Chapman ed., 3d ed. 1977); BRIERLY, supra note 209, at 45-49; SCHACHTER, supra
note 1, at 9-15; Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Empowering the United Nations, 89 FOREIGN AvF.
98-99 (1992); Charney, supra note 231, at 530. But see HENKIN, supra note 1, at 9-10.
325. SCHACHTER, supra note 1, at 401.
326. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
327. See supra notes 204-07 and accompanying text.
328. See, e.g., supra notes 262-63 and accompanying text.
329. U.N. CHARTER arts. 2(1), 51, 103. See also supra notes 137, 212 and accompany-
ing text.
330. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
331. E.g., ALEXANDROV, supra note 1, at 162-63, appears to support his view that the
1981 Israeli raid on the Iraqi nuclear reactor could not be supported by self-defense
because of the 1994 debate on imposing sanctions on North Korea, rather than using
force, due to the danger of nuclear weapons. MCCORMACK, supra note 1, at 98-99,
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The developing law for jus in bello confirms that the proper time for
predicating liability is what decision-makers knew, or should have known,
when an operation was authorized. While the hindsight of a judicial exam-
ination can be 20/20, decisions at the time may be clouded with the fog of
war.
332
Declarations of understanding333 of four countries party to the 1977
Protocol 1334 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949335 state that for protec-
derides the claim that the fact that Israel had been given a necessary guarantee of secur-
ity under the U.S. "Star Wars" program was a reason why it may not have been necessary
for Israel to bomb the reactor.
332. See voN CLAUsEWrrZ, supra note 136, at 117-21.
333. The RESTATEMENT analyzes declarations and understandings:
When signing or adhering to an international agreement, a state may make a
unilateral declaration that does not purport to be a reservation. Whatever it is
called, it constitutes a reservation in fact if it purports to exclude, limit, or mod-
ify the state's legal obligation. Sometimes, however, a declaration purports to be
an "understanding," an interpretation of the agreement in a particular respect.
Such an interpretive declaration is not a reservation if it reflects the accepted
view of the agreement. But another ... party may challenge the expressed
understanding, treating it as a reservation which it is not prepared to accept.
[For] a multilateral agreement, a declaration of understanding may have com-
plex consequences. If it is acceptable to all .... they need only acquiesce. If,
however, some.., share or accept the understanding but others do not, there
may be a dispute as to what the agreement means, and whether the declaration
is in effect a reservation. In the absence of an authoritative means for resolving
that dispute, the declaration, even if treated as a reservation, might create an
agreement at least between the declaring state and those who agree with that
understanding. [Restatement (Third), supra, § 313(2)(c), dealing with reserva-
tions] .... However, some... parties may treat it as a reservation and object to
it as such, and there will remain a dispute between the two groups as to what the
agreement means.
RESTATMENT (THiRD), supra note 62, § 313 cmt. b. See also ILC Rep., supra note 224, at
189-90; Bowett, Reservations, supra note 149, at 69; supra note 149 and accompanying
text (analyzing reservations).
334. Protocol Additional to Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter Protocol I]. Although the United States is likely to ratify Protocol Additional
to Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Protocol
II], the Reagan Administration expressed serious reservations concerning Protocol I,
and did not seek Senate advice and consent for it. Letter of Transmittal from President
Reagan to the U.S. Senate (Jan. 29, 1987); Letter of Submittal from Secretary of State"
George P. Schultz to President Reagan (Dec. 13, 1986), in Message from the President of
the United States Transmitting the Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Noninternational Armed Conflicts,
Concluded at Geneva on June 10, 1977, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-2, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1987), reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 561 (1987).
335. Convention for Amelioration of Condition of Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.NT.S. 31; Convention for Amelio-
ration of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention Relative to Treatment of Prisoners of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention Relative to Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [here-
inafter Convention IV].
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tion of civilians, 336 protection of civilian objects, 33 7 and precautions to be
336. Protocol I, supra note 334, art. 51, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 26. Article 51(2) and 51(5)
prohibitions on attacks on civilians, absent other considerations (for example, civilians
who take up arms), restate customary law. MicHAEL BOTHE Er AL., NEw RULES FOR VIC-
TIMS OF ARMED CoNFLicT 299 & n.3 (1982); DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW - THE CoNDucT OF ARMED CoNFLicT AND AIR OPERATIONS: AFP 110-31 ch.
14 (1976); SAN REmo MANUAL, supra note 5, 1 39, at 15; NWP 1-14, supra note 1, icl
6.2.3.2, 11.2 n.3, 11.3 (noting protections also under Convention IV, supra note 335, art.
33, 6 U.S.T. at 3538, 75 U.N.T.S. at 310); NWP 9A, supra note 1, 11 6.2.3.2, 11.2 n.3,
11.3 (same); 4JEAN S. PicET, THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 224-29
(1952); STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS, supra note 218, at 684-732; Michael J. Matheson,
Remarks, in Session One: The United States' Position on the Relation of Customary Interna-
tional Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions, in Symposium, The
Sixth Annual American Red Cross - Washington College of Law Conference on Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law: A Workshop on Customary International Law and the 1977 Pro-
tocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 419, 423,
426 (1987); William G. Schmidt, The Protection of Victims of International Armed Con-
flicts: Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions, 24 AIR FORCE L. REv. 189, 225-32
(1984); Waldemar A. Solf, Protection of Civilians Against the Effects of Hostilities Under
Customary International Law and Under Protocol 1, 1 AM U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 117, 130-31
(1986). Civilians may not be used as human shields, nor may they be a subject of
attacks intended to terrorize them, although otherwise legitimate attacks that happen to
terrorize them are permissible. Specific intent to terrorize gives rise to liability. NWP
9A, supra note 1, 11 11.2, 11.3 (noting protections under Convention IV, supra, arts. 28,
33, 6 U.S.T. at 3538-40, 75 U.N.T.S. at 308-10); Hans-Peter Gasser, Prohibition of Terror-
ist Attacks in International Humanitarian Law, 1985 INT'L Rev. RED CROSS 200 (1985);
Commission of Jurists to Consider and Report Upon Revision of Rules of Air Warfare,
Hague Rules for Aerial Warfare, art. 22, reprinted in RONZITrI, supra note 163, at 385;
Matheson, supra, at 426; Schmidt, supra, at 227. Rules of distinction, necessity, and
proportionality, with concomitant risk of collateral damage inherent in any attack that
are stated in article 51, generally restate custom. BOTIIE ET AL., supra, at 309-11, 359-67;
FRITS KALSHOVEN, CONSTRAINTS ON THE WAGING OF WAR 99-100 (1987); McDOUGAL &
FELiCLANO, supra note 1, at 525; NWP 9A, supra note 1, 11 5.2 & n.6, 8.1.2.1; SAN REMO
MANUAL, supra note 5, 1I 39-42 & Commentaries; STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS, supra note
218, at 352-53; WJ. Fenrick, The Rule of Proportionality and Protocol I in Conventional
Warfare, 98 MIL. L. REv. 91, 125 (1982) (questioning whether proportionality is an
accepted customary norm); Matheson, supra, at 426; Results of the First Meeting of the
Madrid Plan of Action Held in Bochum, F.R.G., November 1989, 7 BOCHUMER SCHRIrEN
ZUR FiEDENsslcHERUNG UND zum HUMANITAREN VOLKERRECHT 170-71 (1991); Schmidt,
supra, at 233-38; Solf, supra, at 131; GJ.F. van Hegelsom, Methods and Means of Combat
in Naval Warfare, in 8 BOCHUMER ScHnRm?N ZUR FRIEDENSSICHERUNG UND ZUM
HUMANITAREN VOLKERRECHT 1, 18-19 (1992).
337. Protocol I, supra note 334, art. 52, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 26. Article 52 states a gen-
eral customary norm, except for its prohibition on reprisals against civilians in article
52(1), for which there are divergent views. See generally BOTHE Er AL., supra note 336, at
320-27; COLOMBOS, supra note 163, §§ 510-11, 524-25, 528-29, at 501-04; NWP 1-14,
supra note 1, I 6.2.3 & n.36, 6.2.3.2 (noting protections for some civilians from repri-
sals under Fourth Convention, supra note 336, art. 33, 6 U.S.T. at 3538, 75 U.N.T.S. at
308-10), 8.1.1 & n.9, 8.1.2 & n.12 (noting U.S. position that Protocol I, supra, art.
52[1], 1125 U.N.T.S. at 27, "creates new law"); NWP 9A, supra note 1, 1l1 6.2.3 & n.33,
6.2.3.2, 8.1.1. & n.9, 8.1.2 & n. 12 (same); 2 O'CONNELL, supra note 4, at 1105-06; 4
PIcTET, supra note 336, at 131; CLAUD PILLOUD, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTO-
COtS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEvA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, T1 1994-2038, at
630-38 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987); Matheson, supra note 336, at 426; Solf, supra
note 336, at 131. But see Frank Russo, Jr., Targeting Theory in the Law of Naval Warfare,
30 Nay. L. Rev. 1, 17 n.36 (1992) (rejecting application of Protocol I, supra note 334, art.
52(2), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 27, to naval warfare).
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taken in attacks,338 a commander should be liable based on that com-
mander's assessment of information available at the relevant time, when
the decision is made.339 Two of the 1980 Conventional Weapons Conven-
tion's340 protocols have similar terms, stating that a commander is only
bound by information available when a decision to attack is made.34'
Protocol I, with its understandings, and the Conventional Weapons
338. Protocol I, supra note 334, art. 57, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 29. Rules of distinction,
necessity and proportionality, with the concomitant risk of collateral damage inherent
in any attack, in article 51 are generally restatements of customary norms. See generally
BOTE r AL., supra note 336, at 309-11; KALSHOVEN, supra note 336, at 99-100; McDou-
GAL & FELICIANO, supra note 1, at 525; SAN RWmo MANUAL, supra note 5, I 39-42 &
Commentaries; STONE, LEGAL CoNRoLs, supra note 218, at 352-53; Fenrick, supra note
336, at 125 (questioning whether proportionality is accepted as a customary norm);
Matheson, supra note 336, at 426; Results, supra note 336, at 170-71; Schmidt, supra
note 336, at 233-38; Solf, supra note 336, at 131; van Hegelsom, supra note 336, at 18-
19.
339. Declaration of Belgium, May 20, 1986, reprinted in ScHINDLEr & TomAN, supra
note 244, at 706, 707; Declaration of Italy, Feb. 27, 1986, reprinted in SCHINLER &
ToMAN, supra note 244, at 712; Declaration of the Netherlands, June 26, 1977, reprinted
in SCHiNDLER & TOMAN, supra note 244, at 713, 714; Declaration of the United Kingdom,
Dec. 12, 1977, reprinted in SCHiNDLER & TOMAN, supra note 244, at 717.
340. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons Which May Be Deemed Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate
Effects, Oct. 10, 1980, T.I.A.S., 1342 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Conventional Weapons
Convention].
341. Conventional Weapons Convention, supra note 340; Protocol on Prohibitions or
Restrictions on Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices [hereinafter Protocol II],
Oct. 10, 1980, art. 2(4), 1342 U.N.T.S. 168, as amended, May 3, 1996, art. 2(6), 35
I.L.M. 1206, 1209 (1996) [hereinafter Amended Protocol I1]; Protocol on Prohibitions or
Restrictions on Use of Incendiary Weapons [hereinafter Protocol III], Oct. 10, 1980, art.
1(3), 1342 U.NT.S. 171, 172. The United States has ratified the Convention and Proto-
cols I and II, Protocol III is not in force for the United States. TIF, supra note 138, at 454.
However, Amended Protocol II, Protocol Ill and Protocol IV on Blinding Laser Weapons,
May 3, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 1218 (1996) are now before the U.S. Senate. Marian Nash Leich,
Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 91 AL.J. IN-r'L L.
325 (1997). Protocol IV and Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments (Protocol 1), Oct.
10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 168, do not have these provisions. Protocol II and III commen-
tators say little about these provisions; they state the obvious. See Burrus M. Carnahan,
The Law of Land Warfare: Protocol 11 to the United Nations Convention on Certain Conven-
tional Weapons, 105 MIL. L. Rev. 73 (1984); W.J. Fenrick, Comment, New Developments
in the Law Concerning the Use of Conventional Weapons in Armed Conflict, 19 CAN. Y.B.
Irr'L L. 229 (1981); Howard S. Levie, Prohibitions and Restrictions on the Use of Conven-
tional Weapons, 68 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 643 (1994); J. Ashley Roach, Certain Conventional
Weapons Convention: Arms Control or Humanitarian Law?, 105 MIL. L. REv. 3 (1984);
Willam G. Schmidt, The Conventional Weapons Convention: Implications for the American
Soldier, 24 A.F.L. REv. 279 (1984). The United States declared it would not sign Conven-
tion on Prohibition of Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel
Mines and on Their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 1507 (1997). See generally
President William J. Clinton, Remarks on Landmines and an Exchange with Reporters, 33
WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1356-59 (Sept. 22, 1997). Nonetheless, action by other states
indicates that the Convention will be in force soon. More recently, the Clinton Adminis-
tration has pledged that the United States will sign the Convention by 2006, but only if
the Pentagon comes up with an alternate weapon, particularly for land mines in place in
Korea. Steven Lee Myers, Clinton Agrees to Land-Mine Ban, but Not Yet, N.Y. TIMES, May
22, 1998, at A3.
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Convention protocols are on their way to acceptance among states.342
These treaties' common statement, in text or related declarations, that com-
manders will be held accountable based on information they have at the
time for determining whether attacks are necessary and proportional has
become a nearly universal norm. The San Remo Manual recognizes it as
the standard for naval warfare.343 It can be said with fair confidence that
this is the customary standard for jus in bello. It should be the standard
for jus ad bello. A national leader directing a self-defense response,
whether reactive or anticipatory, should be held to the same standard as a
commander in the field making decisions about attacks. A national leader
should be held accountable for what he or she, or those reporting to the
leader, knew or reasonably should have known, when a decision is made to
respond in self-defense.
V. Conclusions and Projections for the Future
After the Congress of Vienna attempted to impose order on post-Napole-
onic Europe, countries great and small tried to preserve peace and promote
national security interests through collective security systems. Some
arrangements have been general, such as the alliance system after Water-
loo. Others have been regional, for example, the treaties negotiated during
the Crimean War. Many have been bilateral. Although many had terms
stating a reactive self-defense theory, others provided for anticipatory self-
defense. Practice of those times reveals use of informal arrangements as
well.3 44
The new factor that emerged after the Franco-Prussian War was defen-
sive alliance systems, often in secret treaties, which could promote aggres-
sive coalition warfare but which provided for reactive and anticipatory
collective self-defense. Arrayed against these alliances were bilateral and
multilateral agreements that also utilized reactive and anticipatory collec-
tive self-defense. 345
The Treaty of Versailles and other agreements ending World War I
established the League of Nations. The Covenant of the League, Part I of
the postwar peace treaties, did not address self-defense directly, although
the Covenant can be read as not excluding self-defense, including anticipa-
tory self-defense. The Pact of Paris and its reservation through diplomatic
notes, while outlawing aggressive war as national policy, preserved an
inherent right of self-defense. Based on the treaty record before the Great
342. Recent Actions Regarding Treaties to Which the United States Is Not a Party, 35
I.L.M. 1339 (1996) lists 145 states party to Protocol I, supra note 334. The United States
is not a party. TIF, supra note 138, at 454, listed 63 states for Conventional Weapons
Convention, supra note 288. Most are parties to Protocols II and III, supra note 341.
343. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 5, 1 46(b), at 16 & Commentary 46.3. See also
BEN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBU-
NALS 90 (1983); DINSTEIN, supra note 1, at 191; McDouGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 1, at
220.
344. See supra notes 18, 42-44 and accompanying text.
345. See supra Part I.B.
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War, this inherent right included anticipatory collective self-defense as an
option for preserving international peace and security. The Nyon Arrange-
ment and practice under it, other international agreements, the Budapest
Articles, and international military tribunal decisions after World War II
confirmed continuation of a right of anticipatory collective self-defense.
There is also evidence that more informal arrangements could be
concluded.346
Thus, in 1945, when the Charter provided, through article 51, for an
inherent right of individual and collective self-defense in the context of the
contemporary Act of Chapultepec, the right that the Charter negotiators
intended as inherent included a right of anticipatory collective self-
defense.347 The record of multilateral treaties, bilateral agreements and
state practice since 1945 confirms that right, the content of which includes
a right to conclude more informal arrangements. And while prior consul-
tation may be a customary prerequisite to exercise of that right, consulta-
tion may include prior planning, including planning for anticipatory
responses. There is nothing in the Caroline Case to forbid such a
response.348 The inherent right to anticipatory collective self-defense,
including the right to engage in more informal arrangements, continues
today as it has existed since the Congress of Vienna. States can no longer
adopt war as an instrument of national policy, but beyond that limitation, a
right to self-defense, anticipatory or reactive, individual or collective, con-
tinues as before.349
Anticipatory collective self-defense, like unilateral anticipatory self-
defense, is always tempered by necessity and proportionality principles.
Nevertheless, the treaty record since 1815, although tortured, occasionally
obscurely phrased, and sometimes muffled through secret treaties or reser-
vations that are not part of published agreements, demonstrates that inter-
national law has recognized, and continues to recognize, a right of
anticipatory collective self-defense. If confidence and participation in the
U.N. system through affirmative Security Council action continues, it is
likely that there will be more, not less, use of anticipatory responses,350
followed by Council decisions 351 on further methods to contain threats to
the peace, breaches of the peace, threats to states' territorial integrity,
aggression, or invasion. One issue that should be resolved in the future is
the temporal problem. States and their leadership should be held to what
they knew, or should have known, when a decision for anticipatory collec-
tive response was taken.
346. See supra notes 219, 245 and accompanying text.
347. See supra Part II.
348. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
349. See supra Part IV.A.
350. Cf. Lowe, supra note 1, at 128.
351. U.N. CHARTER arts. 25, 48. See also SYDNEY D. BAILEY, THE PROCEDURE OF THE UN
SECURITY COUNCIL 235-46 (2d ed. 1988); JORGE CASTENEDA, LEGAL EFFECTS OF UNITED
NATIONS RESOLUTIONS 71-75 (1969); GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 5, at 207-11, 334;
SIMAt, supra note 1, at 410-15, 652; W. Michael Reisman, The Constitutional Crisis in the
United Nations, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 83, 87 (1993).
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Some multilateral self-defense treaties negotiated since World War II
have been abrogated (the Warsaw Pact 352 ) or have fallen into desuetude
(SEATO 35 3). Others, such as the Rio 354 and North Atlantic3 55 treaties,
remain in force. Bilateral agreements have come and gone.3 56 The surviv-
ing agreements' roles may be changing.35 7 New agreements, or perhaps
informal arrangements,358 may be negotiated. What role anticipatory col-
lective self-defense may play in these evolving developments is not clear.
However, the terms of prior agreements, negotiated before and after 1945,
and state practice, show that it would be appropriate, as a matter of inter-
national law, to include anticipatory self-defense as a response option until
the Council acts pursuant to article 51. How anticipatory collective self-
defense as a peremptory norm (jus cogens) fits into this analysis, if at all,
remains an inquiry for the future. 359
352. See supra notes 299-304 and accompanying text.
353. See supra notes 286-89 and accompanying text.
354. See supra notes 255-62 and accompanying text.
355. See supra notes 270-72 and accompanying text.
356. For example, in the case of the United States, its arrangement with the Republic
of China, i.e., the government of Taiwan, was ended by denunciation. The trilateral
ANZUS Pact, supra note 219, has been suspended with respect to New Zealand. U.S.
bilateral treaties with Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea remain in full force, how-
ever. See supra notes 278-85, 305-10 and accompanying text.
357. Compare, e.g., Raymond Ausmus et al., Building a New NATO, FOREIGN Ai'.,
Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 28, and Colin L. Powell, U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead, FOREIGN AFF.,
Winter 1992, at 32, 42, with Owen Harries, The Collapse of "The West," FOREIGN APF.,
Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 41; see also MANDELBAUM, supra note 22; Albright, supra note 95;
Perlmutter & Carpenter, supra note 95.
358. For example, the European Union, successor to the European Economic Com-
munity, has indicated a security role may be part of its agenda. See supra notes 220-21
and accompanying text. See also, e.g., supra note 175 and accompanying text.
359. See Kahgan, supra note 212. See also supra note 212 and accompanying text.
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